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ABSTRACT
When fiscal measures intertwine arbitration, undue mystification sometimes
follows. To enhance analytic clarity, tax-related arbitration might be divided
into three parts. The first derives from ordinary commercial disputes that be-
come laced with incidental tax questions. A corporate acquisition, for exam-
ple, might carry tax consequences which in turn implicate contract claims or
defences presented to an arbitral tribunal for resolution. The second genre of
tax-related arbitration arises in respect of cross-border investment disputes.
Rightly or wrongly, foreign investors often perceive host-country fiscal enact-
ments as discriminatory, unfair, or tantamount to expropriation, thus violat-
ing international commitments. Finally, arbitration comes into play under
income tax treaties when two countries assert rival demands to tax the same
pot of income. Within a single multinational corporate group, potential eco-
nomic double taxation might arise through a mismatch of income and deduc-
tions from one country to the other. Such economic double taxation puts the
corporate group in the role of fiscal stakeholder, ready to pay tax to one
country or the other, but not both. In such a scenario, state-to-state arbitra-
tion can promote symmetry in allocating fiscal jurisdiction, as elaborated
most recently pursuant to the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initia-
tive. The modest aim of this essay lies in decorticating some of the themes,
both practical and doctrinal, that challenge arbitrators tasked with deciding
questions of a fiscal nature.
1 . T H E C O N T O U R S O F T A X A R B I T R A T I O N
1.1 The tripartite division of fiscal disputes
Undue mystification sometimes attaches to arbitration implicating tax measures.
To enhance analytic clarity, one might take inspiration from Caesar’s tripartite char-
acterization of ancient Gaul, dividing tax arbitration into three parts.1
1.1.1 Commercial transactions
The first type of tax arbitration derives from commercial disputes spiced with a
heavy dose of tax content: private business relationships where buyers and sellers
agree to settle their disputes out of court. Arbitrators often address tax matters
as incidental to more basic contract claims and defences, related to taxes paid or
credited.
1 Analogously, Julius Caesar offered a tripartite division of Gaul (Western Europe): ‘Gallia est omnis divisa
in partes tres’, as recorded in 8De Bello Gallico (Book I, ch 1): (i) Gallia Aquitania (modern southwestern
France, north of the Pyrenees), (ii) Gallia Belgica (Belgium/the Netherlands), and (iii) Gallia Celtica
(inhabited by Celtic tribes in today’s France, Switzerland, and Germany on the west bank of the Rhine.
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For example, parties to a corporate transaction might elect to treat a stock pur-
chase as an acquisition of underlying company assets pursuant to domestic fiscal leg-
islation.2 Absent the election, sellers would benefit from favourable tax rates on
capital gain, whereas, the election, in contrast, could result in higher rates on ‘ordi-
nary’ income. The contract might provide adjustment to the purchase price to com-
pensate for incremental tax costs. If a dispute later arises because one side fails to pay
what the other considers appropriate adjustments, then arbitrators designated to re-
solve contract disputes might need to consider the correctness of the parties’ respec-
tive tax positions, including, for example, the tax basis and right to amortize acquired
assets.
With respect to such tax arbitration derived from commercial transactions,
common scenarios implicate contract clauses designating dispute resolution pursu-
ant to the rules of some arbitral institution such as the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association, or the London Court of
International Arbitration. An action for breach of contract, brought by a seller for
the unpaid purchase price, might trigger the buyer’s defence that the relevant tax
code justified deduction of the controverted amounts. The arbitration proceeds
under the normal statutory framework of whatever lex loci arbitri proved applicable
as the arbitral venue, such as the Federal Arbitration Act for a matter heard in New
York, or the relevant provisions of the Code de procédure civile for a case seated
in Paris.
1.1.2 Investor–state arbitration
A second form of fiscal arbitration arises from investor–state controversies. Investors
from abroad might perceive the host-country tax enactment as discriminatory, unfair,
or tantamount to expropriation. The investor’s aim at vindicating its rights may trig-
ger a claim under a bilateral convention for protection of cross-border investment, or
multilateral arrangements such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)3 as well as any
of the bilateral treaties such as the Korea–US Free Trade Agreement,4 or the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its successor, the Agreement between
the USA, The United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA).5
Such treaties often contain provisions related to fair and equitable treatment or
guarantees against expropriation. The investor might see the controverted tax as dis-
guised or indirect expropriation. The host state, in contrast, would consider the tax
as nothing more than a reasonable revenue-raising measure, imposed pursuant to its
sovereign prerogatives.
2 See, eg the US Internal Revenue Code, s 338(h)(10). See also IRC ss 1245 and 1366 related to tax rates
concerning gains from sale of depreciable property and ‘pass-through’ of income items to shareholders.
3 ECT, Lisbon, 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95; 33 ILM 360 (1995), initially intended to facilitate
East–West cooperation between countries of the former Soviet Union (holders of large oil and gas resour-
ces) and western European countries with a strategic interest in diversifying energy supplies.
4 See, eg art 11(16), South Korea–US Free Trade Agreement, 1 July 2007.
5 The NAFTA (which entered into force in 1994) led to backlash against investor–state arbitration.
NAFTA’s successor, the USMCA), was initially signed in 2018, with a revised version signed in December
2019, awaiting ratification at the date of this article.
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With respect to NAFTA’s successor the USMCA, substantial changes lie on the
horizon in resolution of investor–state disputes. What had been Chapter 11 of
NAFTA, providing investment protection, has now become Chapter 14 in USMCA.
Substantive guarantees for investment remain in place, including provisions on appli-
cation of customary international law and expropriation. However, Canada has taken
itself out of the arbitration provisions, which now apply only as between the USA
and Mexico. Provisions on Expropriation continues to apply to taxation measures,
but for arbitration between the USA and Mexico, a ‘tax filter’ process precludes the
arbitration from going forward if designated national tax authorities determine that
the contested measure is not an expropriation.6
These arbitrations may implicate national arbitration law as well as international
treaty commitments. For example, a Dutch court pronounced an annulment in re-
spect of the US$50 billion ‘Yukos Oil Company’ awards against Russia in a well-
publicized instance of arbitration claims based on host state tax measures.7
In such scenarios, debate will focus on whether a controverted fiscal measure con-
stitutes expropriation, discrimination, or lack of fair and equitable treatment, impli-
cating questions of arbitral jurisdiction under relevant treaties, as well as liability and
damages for the allegedly wrongful measures.
In some instances, analogous investor–state arbitration might follow from specific
commitments between a government and a foreign company, such as a concession
to exploit mineral resources. The investor might invoke alleged promises of favour-
able tax rates meant to encourage capital and technology flows from abroad. Such
proceedings often take a hybrid flavour, blending aspects of commercial cases (with
contract rights and duties derived from the concession) and notions of fair treatment
such as found in treaty cases.
1.1.3 Income tax treaties
The final setting for tax arbitration implicates bilateral income tax treaties concluded
to reduce double taxation and fiscal evasion as between two countries. Two countries
might assert rival claims to tax the same pot of income, resulting in economic double
taxation. For example, licence payments by a domestic subsidiary might flow to its
foreign parent. The subsidiary’s country of incorporation and residence might see
the payment as excessive and characterize the amount as lower in order to reduce
the deduction taken by the subsidiary. Such re-characterization often occurs pursuant
6 Arbitration provisions between the USA and Mexico have been included in USMCA Annexes 14-D and
14-E for investment disputes relate to certain government contracts. Substantive guarantees for investment
include Annex 14-A (customary international law) and Annex 14-B (expropriation), with some new limita-
tions such as a ‘case-by-case, fact-based’ test for indirect expropriation under Annex 14-B(3). Provisions on
Expropriation (USMCA art 14.8) continues to apply to taxation measures, subject to the ‘tax filter’ process
contained in the Exceptions of art 32.3.8, the successor to NAFTA art 2103(6).
7 See infra discussion of three Yukos arbitrations, with 2014 awards rendered against the Russian Federation
in favour of Hulley Enterprises (Cyprus) (PCA No AA 226), Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man)
(PCA No AA 227), and Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) (PCA No AA 228). The annulment by the
Hague District Court, on 20 April 2016, was pronounced on the basis that no valid arbitration agreement
existed to support jurisdiction by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal under the ECT.
Proceedings were brought by shareholders of the Moscow-based OAO Yukos Oil Company. The claims
arose from government actions against Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his Bank Menatep.
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to ‘anti-avoidance’ or ‘transfer pricing’ regulations. Without coordination between
the two countries, income might be attributed to one entity without an appropriate
deduction to subsidiary: the parent company might report $5, while the subsidiary
would be able to deduct only $3 on its side of the transaction.
With respect to such controversies, arising under income tax treaties, recent atten-
tion has focused on the initiatives of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) to address Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) that
aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of tax-treaty dispute resolution. A
double tax convention might permit taxpayer recourse to the treaty’s Mutual
Agreement Procedure (MAP), which provides for arbitration of disputes that resist
resolution by the two countries’ competent authorities.8 Such arbitration provisions
have made their way into model fiscal conventions drafted by the USA and the
OECD.9
Allocation of income and deductions among trading partners most often affects
corporate groups with operations in more than one country.10 With respect to a sale
of goods between affiliated business entities in two countries, tax authorities in the
seller’s jurisdiction might consider the contract price to be artificially low, not reflect-
ing a commercially reasonable ‘arm’s length’ payment, and thus seek to increase the
income attributable to the vendor. In contrast, the country with jurisdiction over the
buyer might see the payment as unreasonably high, thus seeking to lower the no-
tional purchase price, in order to reduce deductions that would otherwise decrease
tax liability. The multinational group, of course, would seek consistency, permitting
items of income in one country to be matched by deductions in the other.
Arbitration would address the overlapping or inconsistent fiscal jurisdiction that
could result in either double taxation, or in some instances, in escape from otherwise
fair taxation of the multinational enterprise.
1.2 The ripeness of an idea
A lively debate surrounds the extent to which arbitration should play a role in each
of the three of the above-mentioned contexts: commercial transactions, investor–
state disputes, and income tax treaties.11 In this connection, a great American
tax scholar and practitioner once mused playfully that tax arbitration was an idea
‘whose time always seemed just about to arrive’.12 That advent has now edged
towards reality on several levels.
8 US–Belgium Income Tax Treaty, 27 November 2006, arts 24(7) and 24(8).
9 See art 25 of the Model Income Tax Convention drafted by the OECD and art 25 of the US Model
Income Tax Convention.
10 Analogous questions, of course, do arise with respect to cross-border activities of individuals. See, eg
Boulez v Commissioner (1984) 83 TC 584, implicating whether amounts due the famous French conduc-
tor Pierre Boulez, for work performed in the USA, should be characterized as royalties or payment for
services. Mr Boulez, who at the time was living in Germany, had made sound recordings in New York.
Characterization of the payments as ‘royalties’ might result in a reduced American withholding tax under
the relevant bilateral income tax treaty between the USA and Germany.
11 See generally, William W Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes (OUP 2006; 2nd edn 2012)
679ff.
12 David R Tillinghast, the author of that quip, served to pioneer serious academic and practical thinking on
tax treaty arbitration in a seminal article that examined the prospect of arbitrators deciding questions
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Tax arbitration often suffers from needless mystery and misapprehension. To start
with, the tax profession often (and understandably) communicates by reference to
code numbers and titles, which serve as shorthand for more complex notions.
‘Subpart F’ might cover imposition of tax on a parent company with respect to undis-
tributed foreign subsidiary profits. ‘Section 482’ provides a catch-all designation for
the way income and deductions may be allocated among related taxpayers.
Just as problematic, a certain insularity might on occasion attach to the tax
profession itself. Perhaps overly secure in their specialized knowledge, some tax
practitioners may see no reason to learn new material, such as the legal framework
for recognizing arbitral awards, even though increasingly vital to the fiscal context for
cross-border business.
Controversy about tax arbitration should not be surprising, given that survival
of modern political collectivities rests in large measure on taxation, stirring vigorous
debate not only about ‘how’ tax matters should be arbitrated but also whether
tax disputes may be settled by arbitration at all.13 It should not be surprising that
nation-states would be jealous of the traditional sovereign prerogative to decide dis-
putes implicating interpretation of the revenue-raising on which their existence
depends. Some commentators caution against arbitration for international ‘double
taxation’ disputes without first addressing potential or perceived imbalances between
developing economies, on one hand, and multinational enterprises from more ad-
vanced economic systems, on the other.14
As an initial matter, the notion of ‘tax arbitration’ often proves a misnomer.
The arbitrator might well be simply interpreting the parties’ contract, rather than
construing any revenue statute as such. The real dispute in a corporate acquisition
might relate to what the buyer agreed to pay the seller for a particular asset.
related to (i) transfer pricing, (ii) permanent establishments, and (iii) taxpayer residence. David R
Tillinghast, ‘Choice of Issues to Be Submitted to Arbitration under Income Tax Conventions’ in H Alpert
and K van Raad (eds), Essays on International Taxation (1993) 349. Tillinghast later gave another boost
to tax arbitration by co-authoring the International Fiscal Association study on the subject: William W
Park and David R Tillinghast, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (IFA 2004). Two decades earlier, Swedish
scholars addressed the topic in Gustaf Lindencrona and Nils Mattson, Arbitration in Taxation (1981). See
generally, William W Park, ‘Income Tax Treaty Arbitration’ (2002) 10 George Mason L Rev 803,
reprinted in (2002) 31 Tax Management Int’l J 219, translated as L’arbitrato nei trattati sulle imposte sui
redditi, Rivista di Diritto Tributario Internazionale 3 (gennaio-dicembre 2003).
13 See generally Bernard Hanotiau, ‘L’Arbitrabilité’, Recueil des cours (2002), in Académie de Droit
International de la Haye (2003) 171–80; Pascal Ancel, ‘Arbitrage et ordre public fiscal’ (2001) Rev Arb
269; Matthieu de Boisseson, Le Droit français de l’arbitrage (1990), s 33, 37; Ibrahim Fadallah, ‘L’ordre
public dans les sentences arbitrales’, Recueil des cours (2002), in Académie de Droit International de la
Haye (1994) 369, paras 54–56, 410–11; Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold Goldman,
International Commercial Arbitration (E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), English Language edn, 1999) 348
and 359 (ss 579, n 478, and 589–1); Luca Melchionna, ‘Tax Disputes and International Commercial
Arbitration’ (2003) 74 Diritto e Pratica Tributaria Internazionale 769 (2003); Luca Melchionna,
‘Arbitrability of Tax Disputes’ IBA Section on Business Law, Arbitration and ADR Committee Newsletter
21 (May 2004); Thomas Carbonneau and Andrew Sheldrick, ‘Tax Liability and Inarbitrability in
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1992) 1 J Trans’l Law & Policy 23, 38 (‘[T]he resolution of statu-
tory claims involving tax issues is unsuitable for arbitration.’).
14 See Michael Lennard, ‘Transfer Pricing Arbitration as an Option for Developing Countries’ (2014) 42(3)
Intertax 179, 179–80.
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However, determining that price could implicate tax consequences that prove elusive
at the beginning of the transaction.
For example, a sale of shares might implicate an election for treatment as a purchase
of underlying assets, thus permitting a ‘step up’ in basis to the buyer.15 On the sellers’
side, a sale of stock without the election would have been treated as capital gain, taxed
at a lower rate than with the election that resulted in taxation at higher ‘ordinary’ rates.
If acquired assets include a contingent claim, the contract might provide for a
price adjustment to the seller for the additional tax to be paid when the contingent
claim finalized gets settled and proceeds become realized. A difference of opinion on
what this tax should be, and what adjustment would be owing to the sellers, would
be sent to arbitration under the contract’s general dispute resolution clause. Of
course, a superficial observation of the deal might ask why a dispute should arise if
the tax code provides clarity. The same could be said about any of the myriad dis-
putes arising from corporate acquisitions which trigger legal consequences viewed
differently from divergent perspectives.
Nevertheless, despite scholarly doubts and doctrinal objections, the binding pri-
vate resolution of tax-related disputes through arbitration remains very much a real-
ity. Arbitrators routinely address tax measures in the context of both commercial
contracts and investor claims against host states for discrimination, expropriation,
and unfair treatment.16
Tax arbitration remains highly fact-intensive, with few general rules. In some
instances, the claim may not be ripe for adjudication, perhaps because the govern-
ment has not yet ruled on the amount of tax (if any) payable. In other cases, the
relevant investment treaty or arbitration clause may remove certain types of tax con-
troversies from the arbitrators’ power.17
This essay compares the various contexts in which fiscal matters may be subject
to arbitration, exploring why tax measures affect the universe of questions that arbi-
trators could normally be expected to address. In part, the modest aims of the paper
lie in (i) helping the reader to understand how tax arbitration can enhance efficiency
and fairness in economic relationships, particularly with a cross-border element, and
(ii) with respect to investor–state relations, suggesting an analytic starting point for
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate taxation.
Augmenting these initial hurdles, understanding tax arbitration implicates a
further challenge. Arbitrators hear fiscal controversies in at least three dramatically
15 See discussion infra noting US Internal Revenue Code, s 338(h)(10), where the seller and the buyer
make a joint election for such deemed asset acquisition treatment.
16 In this connection, one recollects the story of an elderly Maine farmer asked by his pastor about his belief
in baptism. Being a sceptic, but hoping to avoid a theological controversy that would delay supper, the
old man replied, ‘Believe in it? Reverend, I’ve seen it done!’ Likewise, much discussion of tax arbitration
resembles the proverbial law faculty exchange in which one professor confronts his colleague with the
taunt, ‘Well, even if your ideas work in practice, they do not work in theory.’
17 Distinctions are sometimes made between arbitral jurisdiction (compétence) and the ‘admissibility’ (rece-
vabilité) of a claim. When claims are barred for reasons such as ripeness, they are said to be not admissi-
ble (receivable). While otherwise subject to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the pre-conditions for their proper
consideration have not been met. By contrast, a treaty prohibition on arbitration of particular tax claims
could constitute a bar to the legitimate authority of an arbitrator even to consider such matters.
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divergent contexts: commercial transactions, tax treaties, and investor–state disputes.
Each field implicates its own particular legal framework, to which we shall now turn.
The following sections address the details of tax arbitration for the above-noted
three contexts of tax controversies: commercial, investor–state, and income tax
treaty.
2 . C O M M E R C I A L T R A N S A C T I O N S
With respect to arbitration of tax matters arising from private business relationships,
several different scenarios arise.18 In the wake of a corporate acquisition, the buyer
and the seller might disagree on who should bear taxes due for tax liabilities imposed
on the company that had been the object of the sale. Or, an allegation might be
made that the seller misrepresented corporate tax liabilities, either by reason of
accounting irregularities or in hiding investigations by local revenue authorities.
In some instances, disagreement on the balance sheet might relate to whether
certain items of machinery should (or should not) have been capitalized, with a rea-
sonable useful life established for later depreciation.
On occasion, a seller will withhold a portion of the payment price under an acqui-
sition agreement providing for arbitration. Or a buyer may fail to pay the full amount
provided in the contract. A dispute may arise about the appropriateness of the with-
holding or failure to pay, related to grievances and disagreements about taxation of
certain items of corporate revenue.
Some legal regimes permit stock purchases to be treated as asset acquisitions,
thus permitting a ‘step up’ in basis.19 The buyer thus obtains greater depreciation
and/or amortization deductions, with an agreement that appropriate adjustments of
the price might follow in due course. If the contract so provides, an arbitral tribunal
might determine any differences of opinion between buyer and seller about the cor-
rect measure of adjustment.
There might be issues about which party gets the benefits and/or burdens of cred-
its and liabilities under a ‘tax allocation agreement’ concluded pursuant to a corpo-
rate spin-off. In some instances, disputes among joint venture partners might arise
with respect to whether one partner was authorized to make payments to a foreign
country on behalf of another.
And last but not least, of course, taxpayers have been known to sue their advisers.
Often claims arise when advice about a tax shelter proves unfounded and leads to lia-
bility.20 The contract with the legal or accounting adviser may well include an arbitra-
tion clause, calling for the arbitrator to assess whether due diligence was exercised by
the service provider.
18 For examples of domestic and international tax arbitration, see Ace Ltd v Cigna Corp (2001) WL 767015;
ICC Award Nos 6515 and 6516, in Collection of Arbitral Awards/Recueil des sentences arbitrales de la CCI,
vol IV (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez ed., 1996–2000) 241. For tax arbitration within the USA, see IRS Ann
2000–04 and 2002–60.
19 Internal Revenue Code, s 338(h)(10). The seller and the buyer make a joint election for such treatment.
20 Reddan v KPMG (2006) 457 F 3d 1054 (9th Cir) (tax shelter sponsor held bound to arbitrate on the ba-
sis of an arbitration clause in brokerage contract related to the tax shelter transaction); Vassaluzzo v Ernst
& Young (2007) WL 2076471 (Mass Super Ct); Vassaluzzo v Ernst & Young and Sidley Austin (2007) CA
No 06-4215 (Mass Super Ct) (malpractice action for advice on an unsuccessful tax shelter, arbitration
clause in engagement letter found to cover some but not all transactions).
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Sometimes, tax rules may serve to obfuscate the real nature of the disagreement.
For example, a corporate acquisition agreement might provide (allegedly) for addi-
tional payments on recovery of contingent claims. If the buyer withholds payment,
the real dispute might implicate questions concerning what the acquisition agree-
ment provides: did the seller, in fact, have an obligation to reimburse the buyer for
the full amount of the recovered claim? Or just the claim less the tax liability? If the
latter, what basis might be taken for determining the amount due the tax authorities?
If for tax purposes the transaction will be characterized as an asset acquisition, rather
than a stock purchase,21 the complexities of that fiscal context may hide (at last from
some observers) the more fundamental issue of what precisely the two sides agreed
to allocate from buyer to seller. For instance, to what extent will an asset’s amortiza-
tion or depreciation be offset by tax due? Legitimate tax issues often intertwine nuan-
ces of party agreement.
Human nature being what it is, it should be no surprise that each side will be
tempted to muddy analytic waters (or provide clarity, depending on perspective) by
mixing and matching issues of tax code interpretation with contract construction.
Each aspect of the dispute will play a part in its resolution by the arbitrator. Often,
neither the tax code nor the contract may be a model of clarity.
In this context, public policy objections to tax arbitration prove a red herring,
a purported clue that misleads or distracts, rather than assists sound analysis.
Often, arbitrators in a commercial tax dispute will not be interpreting the relevant
revenue code, as such, but will be construing the parties’ agreement, with tax as a
background.
For example, returning to the corporate acquisition scenario evoked above, the
arbitrators might determine that the share purchase agreement, signed in 2016, re-
quired the buyer to pay the seller for the recovery of a contingent litigation claim
when the value has been ascertained, which occurred in 2018, less the tax incurred
by buyer on that recovery. Evidentiary hearings might have been held to determine
proper construction of the contract or to investigate any purported side agreement
between the two parties. The bottom line would be an award to pay $36 million.
To reach that result, however, the arbitrators might be bombarded with submis-
sions and arguments touching on the so-called ‘technicalities’ of fiscal law. What was
the ‘basis’ for the claim, to be used in determining tax liability? Can the recovered
claim be amortized for tax purposes? What effect, if any, will be played by the ‘open
transaction’ doctrine, permitting postponement of recognition of gain or loss until
the amount realized is readily ascertainable. If the purchasing corporation makes the
appropriate tax election, the target corporation may be treated as having sold its
assets at fair market value, with the appropriate tax consequences of revaluing buyer’s
basis,22 a Treasury filing might be made (such as Form 8883 in the USA), memorial-
izing the assets transferred. The arbitrators might need to determine the import of
that filing.
21 For example, in the USA the sale might trigger an election under Internal Revenue Code, s 338(h)(10),
which as noted above permits the stock purchase to be ‘deemed’ (treated as) an asset acquisition for tax
purposes, providing later consequences inter alia in respect of depreciation.
22 US Internal Revenue Code, s 338.
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The basic question for decision by the arbitrators, however, still relates to what
the seller agreed with the buyer: not an interpretative analysis of disputed matters of
national fiscal policy. The distinction remains vital to assessing the viability of tax ar-
bitration, given how critics sometimes fret that private decision-makers usurp public
functions in relation to revenue laws, thus long raising questions on arbitrability that
may miss the mark when viewed against the background of what does, or even
what could, happen in tax arbitration.23 Of course, the concern about ‘subject matter
arbitrability’ arises in other contexts, each of which must be assessed on its own
merits. 24
3 . I N V E S T O R – S T A T E D I S P U T E S
3.1 Expropriation and its fiscal cousins
In considering the interaction between taxation and investment protection, one may
recall the line attributed to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, proposing that the art of taxation
consists in ‘so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the
smallest amount of hissing’.25 Among the constants in taxation through the ages, few
have been more persistent than the need to distinguish taxes ‘à la Colbert’ (looking
simply to seize the most money with the least fuss) from the more legitimate form of
revenue-raising that enables or shapes desirable social and economic behaviour.26
Arbitration provides one mechanism for such line-drawing in the context of con-
crete cross-border investment disputes between foreign investors and host states. On
rare occasions, a government may agree on an ad hoc basis to arbitrate disputes over
the quantum of a foreign investor’s tax liability.27 Much more common, however, are
treaty-based claims by investors alleging that the host state imposed tax in a discrimi-
natory or arbitrary manner, or used tax as a vehicle for expropriation without com-
pensation.28 Such tax-related investment disputes remain qualitatively different from
23 See, eg survey in Hanotiau (n 13); Ancel (n 13).
24 Analogous questions, albeit quite distinct, arise in connection with religious ‘courts’, which from the per-
spective of the secular state would be considered arbitration tribunals, as, eg a Muslim or Jewish body ap-
plying Sharia or Halakha. See, eg Robert Blackett, ‘Revisiting the Status of Religious “Courts” in English
Law’ in Melanie Willems (ed), The Arbiter (2018) 8–10. See also Soleimany v Soleimany [1998] 3 WLR
811 (refusal to enforce Beth Din award giving effect to smuggling operation by family carpet business),
discussed in Shai Wade, ‘Westacre v. Soleimany: What Policy? Which Public?’ (1999) 3 Int’l Arb Law
Rev 97.
25 In 17th-century France, of course, taxation implicated a tangle of ad hoc mechanisms to finance royal life-
style, rather than a systematic instrument of economic or social policy. See André Meurrisse, Histoire de
l’impôt (1978) 83–90, recounting more than a century of tax escapades ultimately contributing to the
French revolution of 1789. Nevertheless, many aspects of taxation continue from one century to another,
including the perennial need for more money in wartime. Shortly after Colbert’s death in the late 17th
century, French aggression in the German Palatine created a need for more creative revenue-raising meas-
ures, and also triggered a half century of armed conflict against the so-called Grand Alliance, a prototype
EU, minus France of course.
26 For an in-depth treatment of conduct-shaping taxation, see Xavier Oberson, Les Taxes d’Orientation
(1991).
27 See Jean-Pierre LeGall, ‘Fiscalité et arbitrage’ (1994) Rev Arb 3 (noting at 24–25 several international tax
arbitrations); Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Tax Disputes Between States and Foreign Investors’ (1997) NYLJ, 3.
28 See generally, Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, ‘Investor-State Tax Disputes: The Interface Between
Treaty-based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty’ (2007) 35 Intertax 424;
Richard Happ, Beilegung von Steuerstreitigkeiten zwischen Investoren und ausländischen Staaten durch
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the commercial or tax treaty context. In an investment dispute, questions arise about
the very legitimacy of the tax.
The controversy does not concern shifting normal fiscal burdens between a buyer
and a seller, or the tax authorities in the parent’s home state as opposed to the sub-
sidiary’s country of incorporation. Rather, an assertion might be made that the tax li-
ability is not really a tax at all, but rather a disguised attempt at confiscation or a
pretext for confiscation. It is to these types of controversy that we now turn our
attention.
3.2 The Matryoshka: rules within rules
The current network of investment and free trade agreements was adopted to en-
hance economic cooperation and cross-border capital flows through a two-part re-
gime: (i) substantive investor protections against discrimination, confiscation, and
other unfair governmental measures and (ii) a relatively neutral dispute resolution
mechanism in the event of disagreement on how those protections should operate.29
The cornerstone of most investment treaties lies in a prohibition of uncompen-
sated expropriation of foreign-owned property, whether such expropriation is direct
or indirect.30 However, the treatment of tax measures related to expropriation
remains far from simple and brings to mind the Russian nested doll, or matryoshka.
One carved figure opens to reveal another, which in turn unlocks to yield yet more
diminutive figurines. Treaty-based investor protection schemes contain fiscal provi-
sions that unfold with exceptions to the exceptions.
Schiedsgerichte IStR 2006) 649–54; Alireza Salehifar, ‘Rethinking the Role of Arbitration in International
Tax Treaties’ (2020) 37 J Int’l Arb 87 (Kluwer). See also discussion of the Yukos arbitrations, infra,
brought by the three Cypriot entities that together held 70.5% of the former Yukos Oil Company: Hulley
Enterprises, Yukos Universal, and Veteran Petroleum. The three awards rendered on 18 July 2014 were
Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation (2014) Award, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No
AA 226; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation (2014) PCA Case No AA 227;
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation (2014) PCA Case No AA 228.
29 See generally, William W Park and Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, ‘The New Face of Investment Arbitration’
(2003) 28 Yale J Int’l L 365 (2003). Not all would agree with this positive assessment of investment pro-
tection regimes, as witnessed by Bolivia’s denunciation of its obligations under the ICSID Convention
(effective in late 2007), followed by Nicaragua’s threat to withdraw from that Convention, Venezuela’s
decision to withdraw from the World Bank and Ecuador’s declaration of intent to abrogate its bilateral in-
vestment treaty with the USA and remove ICSID jurisdiction related to oil and mining. See Emmanuel
Gaillard, ‘The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention’ (2007) NYLJ. For a historical view of investment
protection, see William W Park, ‘Legal Issues in the Third World’s Economic Development’ (1981) 61
BUL Rev 1321. For an intriguing perspective on the origins of the debate, see Eugene Staley, War and the
Private Investor (1935).
30 On indirect expropriation, see Michael Reisman and Robert Sloane, ‘Indirect Expropriation and Its
Valuation in the BIT Generation’ (2003) 74 Brit Yrbk Intl L 115; Rachell Edsall, ‘Indirect Expropriation
under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare
Regulations’ (2006) 86 BUL Rev 931; Burns H Weston, ‘“Constructive Takings” under International
Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation”’ (1975) 16 Va J Intl L 103. For an il-
lustration of indirect expropriation, see Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co,
Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (2d Phase) (1970) ICJ 3, 9 ILM 227, where a Canadian company’s profitable
Spanish assets were taken through a bankruptcy proceeding allegedly orchestrated to reward a supporter
of then-dictator General Francisco Franco. The bankruptcy resulted when Spanish authorities refused to
permit transfer of foreign currency necessary to service Sterling bonds.
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In one significant way, however, interpreting investment treaties differs from
opening a matryoshka. While the doll releases smaller figures, treaty exceptions often
reveal other exceptions that prove as capacious as the provision from which they
derogate.
To illustrate, the ECT31 establishes a general rule on fiscal measures in Article 21:
‘Nothing in this Treaty shall create rights or impose obligations with respect to
Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties.’32 The same Article then enumerates
provisions that will apply to tax measures: prohibitions against discrimination33 and
uncompensated expropriation,34 for which investors may seek redress through arbi-
tration.35 The non-discrimination rule, however, excludes from its application both in-
come and capital taxes, as well as tax collection measures. A carve-out for collection
measures that ‘arbitrarily’ restrict treaty benefits creates another exception from the ex-
clusion, thus allowing claims based on some (but not all) collection practices.36
Thus, the interaction of investment treaties and tax measures often contains a
level of complexity that makes discourse difficult, with multiple qualifiers for even
simple propositions. Other than insurance policies and revenue codes, few public
documents present as many exegetical challenges, leading some to suggest that ECT
Article 21 is ‘barely intelligible’ and possibly ripe for amendment, while others sug-
gest that the ability of a number of investor–state tribunals to apply Article 21 in a
balanced manner indicates that its provisions are sufficiently clear.37
31 ECT (n 3). The ECT was intended to facilitate East–West cooperation between countries of the former
Soviet Union (holders of large oil and gas resources) and western European countries with a strategic in-
terest in diversifying their energy supplies. See generally, Thomas W Walde, The Energy Charter Treaty:
An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade (1996); Julia Doré and Robert De Bauw, The Energy
Charter Treaty: Origins, Aims and Prospects (1995); Thomas W Walde, Investment Arbitration and the
Energy Charter Treaty (Clarisse Ribeiro ed, 2006); Mirian Kene Omalu, NAFTA and the Energy Charter
Treaty (1999). See also, Kaj Hobér, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty – Awards Rendered’ (2007) 1 Disp Res
Int’l 36 (IBA); Steivan Defilla, ‘Trade under the ECT and Accession to the WTO’ (2003) 21 J Energy
Nat Resources L 428; Lawrence Herman, ‘NAFTA and the ECT: Divergent Approaches with a Core of
Harmony’ (1997) 15 J Energy Nat Resources L 131.
32 Other bilateral or multilateral investment regimes have analogous provisions. See, eg NAFTA art
2103(1), now USMCA art 32.3.8; 2004 US Model BIT, art 21; US–Ecuador BIT, art 10; Canada–
Ecuador BIT, art 12. See the Appendices for the text of these provisions.
33 art 21(3) says that arts 10(2) and 10(7) ‘shall apply to Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties
other than those on income and on capital’. These two subsections of art 10 relate to non-discrimination
and most favoured nation treatment. In turn, exceptions to the exception exist inter alia for tax collection
mechanisms or provisions of economic integration organizations and income tax treaties in art
21(7)(a)(ii). The carve-out for tax on income and on capital leaves some of the most significant catego-
ries of fiscal measures, including value added tax, import and export duties, and stamp taxes. Significantly,
the ECT exclusion does not refer to art 10(1), mandating ‘fair and equitable treatment’.
34 ECT art 21(5) says that ‘Article 13 shall apply to taxes.’ art 13(1)(d) requires nationalization, expropria-
tion, or measures equivalent to nationalization or expropriation to be accompanied inter alia by ‘the pay-
ment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation’.
35 ECT art 26 permits arbitration under the rules of ICSID, UNCITRAL, and the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce. For investors from countries that are not a party to the 1965 Washington Convention, the
dispute may be subject to the rules of the ICSID Additional Facility.
36 ECT art 21.
37 See Ugur Erman Özgür, ‘Taxation of Foreign Investments under International Law: Article 21 of the
Energy Charter Treaty in Context’ (2015) Energy Charter Secretariat Report, 16, 64–65 (suggesting
options including, an amendment to the ECT, issuing a Protocol or a Declaration as per art 1(13)(a) and
(b) of the Treaty, and an interpretative note in order to clarify the object and purpose of ambiguous
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As mentioned above, the ECT states that it does not create rights or impose
obligations with respect to taxation measures.38 However, the Treaty continues by
making an exception for its most favoured nation provisions, which the Treaty says
do apply to tax measures,39 but only as to indirect taxes such as value added tax
(VAT), excise tax, and stamp duties, as well as import and export duties, rather than
taxes on income and capital.40
Moreover, the rule that non-discrimination provisions apply to tax measures
contains several exceptions that include, inter alia, tax collection mechanisms.41 This
exception to an exception contains its own additional exception, with respect to
measures that ‘arbitrarily’ discriminate against investors from the other contracting
party. There are also exceptions for advantages accorded under regional economic
integration organizations42 and income tax treaties.43 As to these items, one is sent
back into the general rule that no rights are created or obligations imposed.
The ECT definition of ‘taxes’ further complicates things by explicitly excluding
customs duties.44 If customs duties are not taxes, then the initial exclusion (creating
no rights and imposing no duties with respect to tax measures) would not apply
in the first place. So the otherwise applicable investor protections (including fair
and equitable treatment) remain in force, notwithstanding that they were initially
excluded with regard to tax measures.45
As a general matter, a number of treaties contain restrictions on the ability to
bring claims based on fair and equitable treatment with respect to fiscal measures.46
These restrictions stem from the concern that notions of fairness and equity remain
terms and provisions in art 21 of the ECT as per art 31(3)(a) of the VCLT). Compare Sebastián Green
Martı́nez, ‘Taxation Measures under the Energy Charter Treaty after the Yukos Awards Articles 21(1)
and 21(5)’ (2019) 34(1) ICSID Rev 85, 87, 106 (concluding that amending ECT art 21 ‘would be a time
and resources-consuming negotiation that no longer appears to be necessary’).
38 ECT art 21. At some places, the ECT refers to ‘Taxation Measures’ (art 21, sub-ss 1–4), while at other
places the Treaty uses the term ‘taxes’ (see art 21(5) concerning expropriation rules under art 13), with-
out any explicit indication of why the different phraseology was chosen.
39 ECT arts 10(2) and 10(7).
40 By way of comparison, consider the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which covers im-
port barriers of a fiscal nature in respect of indirect taxes such as sales taxes, excise taxes, and VATs.
Direct taxes might be seen as violating the GATT ‘most favored nation’ provisions. For a general treat-
ment of ‘tax and trade’, see Reuven S Avi-Yonah and Martin G Vallespinos, ‘The Elephant Always
Forgets: US Tax Reform and the WTO’ (University of Michigan Law School 2018) Law & Economics
Working Papers <https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/151>.
41 ECT, art 21(3)(b).
42 ibid, art 21(3)(a).
43 See ibid, art 21(3)(a), with its cross-reference to art 21(7)(a)(ii), which includes any international agree-
ment ‘for the avoidance of double taxation’.
44 ibid, art 21(7)(d).
45 art 21(3) states explicitly that the non-discrimination and most favoured nation provisions of art 10(2)
and (7) will apply to taxation measures, but makes no mention of art 10(1), the provision mandating ‘fair
and equitable treatment’ with a goal to ‘encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent
conditions for investors’.
46 See, eg art X of the US–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, Signed 27 August 1993; entered into force
11 May 1997, 103d Congress, Senate Treaty Doc 103-15; art 2103 of NAFTA, now art 32.3 of USMCA,
32 ILM 289, 605 (1993); art XIII, paras 3 and 4 of the UK–Colombia Bilateral Investment Treaty, signed
17 March 2010, entered into force 10 October 2014.
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too malleable and chameleon-like to be useful, and could lend themselves to mis-
chief, at least from the host state’s perspective.
Other treaties focus more narrowly on restricting claims for discrimination.
NAFTA and its successor USMCA allow a limited category of investor claims for dis-
crimination,47 albeit with carve-out provisions for claims related to fair and equitable
treatment. Other international treaties carve out protections for non-discrimination
in tax measures, which makes sense because many countries have concluded treaties
or economic unions providing reciprocal fiscal privileges with some countries, but
not others.
Investment treaties based on the Dutch Model BIT (such as the Netherlands–
Venezuela treaty)48 contain a limitation on the scope of national treatment and
most favoured nation treatment with respect to tax measures and claims arising out
of discrimination as a result of, inter alia, participation in economic unions.49
Exceptions to tax measures with regard to national treatment and most favoured
nation treatment often found in modern investment treaties, echo provisions in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services which similarly limit the extent to which
national treatment and the most favoured nation obligations apply to taxation
measures.
Carve-outs also arise when discrimination occurs as a result of features in tax
codes, which apply in a discriminatory fashion as a result of administrative conve-
nience. For example, foreigners and nationals might receive different fiscal treatment
for capital gain and ordinary income,50 given the difficulty of arranging overseas
audits and enforcement.
To illustrate, US Internal Revenue Code section 884 imposes a tax on the ‘divi-
dend equivalent amount’ of profits earned by foreign (but not domestic)
47 NAFTA art 2103(4), now art 32.3.6 of USMCA, allows the non-discrimination provisions to apply to tax-
ation measures on income and capital gains in relation to the purchase or consumption of certain services,
but disallows application of certain non-discrimination provisions with respect income or capital gains re-
garding estates, inheritances, and the like. In the case of Feldman v Mexico, the investor won an award of
damages due to Mexico’s violation of non-discrimination provisions with respect to fiscal measures.
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1; Award and
Dissenting Opinion of 16 December 2002, published in 42 ILM 625 (2003), finding Mexico liable for dis-
criminatory tax under NAFTA, which in s 2803(4) says that non-discrimination provisions of art 1102
shall apply to tax measures.
48 art 4 of the Netherlands–Venezuela Treaty provides inter alia that taxes by one state, on nationals of the
other Contracting Party with respect to investments in its territory, shall not receive treatment less
favourable than that accorded to its own nationals or to those of any third state.
49 The OECD has also interpreted art 4 of the Dutch Model BIT as a limitation on most favoured nation
and national treatment with regard to fiscal measures. See OECD, ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in
International Investment Law’ (2004) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004/02, 6
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/518757021651>. In some instances, ICSID tribunals interpreting art 4 of
the Netherlands–Venezuela BIT have construed the provision as constituting the entirety of treaty obliga-
tions that Venezuela and the Netherlands owed to each other with regard to fiscal measures. See
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata BV, ConocoPhillips Hamaca BV and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria BV v Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela (2013) ICSID Case No ARB/07/30, decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits dated
3 September 2013, paras 301–316.
50 See, eg US IRC, ss 897 and 1445, taxing non-resident aliens and foreign corporations on sales of realty as
if the foreign person were engaged in a trade or business, and overriding any otherwise applicable income
tax treaty provisions. The special treatment, dating to 1980, derived from a concern at that time over in-
creasing foreign purchases of American real estate following the oil crisis of 1973/74.
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corporations. This tax tends to equalize the burden imposed on foreign entities oper-
ating through branches and those using corporate subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the
measure subjects foreign companies to a tax not imposed on their domestic counter-
parts. Indeed, the American tax authorities have recognized that in appropriate
instances, relief may be available through non-discrimination provisions of double
tax conventions.51
Most developed countries tax non-resident aliens and foreign corporations on
their passive income (such as dividends and interest) based on gross receipts
although citizens and residents, in contrast, pay tax on net income.52 For example,
the default rule in the USA remains a 30-per cent tax on gross amounts of dividends
received by foreigners, and 10 per cent on the gross realized by them on real estate
dispositions.53 In contrast, residents and citizens are taxed only on net gain, whether
from securities or real estate.
3.3 The nature of tax measures
3.3.1 Fire, passion, and taxes
Like fire and passion, taxation can bring ruin as well as blessing. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes rightly observed that taxes provide the wherewithal for public bene-
fits we associate with civilized life. In one of his famous dissents, he observed, ‘Taxes
are what we pay for civilized society.’54
Fiscal measures also have a darker side, sometimes serving as a vehicle for indirect
asset confiscation. As the oft-cited paraphrase of another American Supreme Court
Justice suggests, ‘The power to tax is the power to destroy.’55
This special potential for abuse reflects itself in the fiscal provisions of most in-
vestment treaties, which set forth intricate rules to assist in the fact-intensive triage
51 See Treasury Regulations, s 1.884-1(g). See also art 24 (‘Non-Discrimination’), US Model Income Tax
Convention, 16 November 2006.
52 See, eg Reuven Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’
(2000) 113 Harvard L Rev 1573; Michael J Graetz, Foundations of International Income Taxation (2003)
ch 7.
53 See, eg IRC, ss 871 and 881 on dividends and other passive income. When applicable, most treaties re-
duce this gross amount to more reasonable proportions. See OECD Model Income Tax Convention, arts
10 (dividends), 11 (interest), and 12 (royalties). With respect to real estate dispositions, IRC, s 1445,
imposes a tax on the gross amount realized, which can in some instances be adjusted if the taxpayer
reaches an agreement with the government. Unlike passive income, however, real estate dispositions do
not benefit from treaty-based tax benefits. See FIRPTA ‘Treaty Override’ in PL 96-499 (1980) s 1125.
54 The line comes from a dissent while a Justice on the US Supreme Court, in the case Compa~nı́a General de
Tabaco de Filipinas v Collector of Internal Revenue (1927) 275 US 87, 100. The catchphrase was later taken
by President Franklin D Roosevelt, who said that taxes were ‘the dues that we pay for the privileges of
membership in an organized society’. Address in Worcester, Massachusetts, 21 October 1936. See
Franklin D Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol 5 (Samuel I Rosenman ed
1938) 522–23.
55 McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 327. A federally chartered bank had established
branches in various states, one of which was Maryland. When that state imposed a tax on bank opera-
tions, the cashier of the Baltimore branch (one James McCulloch) refused to pay. The opinion by
Chief Justice Marshall, upholding the power of Congress to create a national bank and ruling the
Maryland tax unconstitutional, contained the following language: ‘An unlimited power to tax involves,
necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no institution and no property
can bear taxation.’
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between normal and abnormal taxes. Some tax measures give rise to claims for expro-
priation or discrimination, while others do not. As we shall see, line-drawing resists
facile analysis in respect of these two categories.
3.3.2. Tax as taking
No consensus exists on why tax measures should receive special attention in invest-
ment treaties. Raising revenue does constitute a core activity of all political collectivi-
ties. However, the same can be said of many other government functions (such as
administration of justice or environmental protection) that regularly give rise to
claims by foreign investors.56 For example, an effective judiciary remains vital to any
concept of sovereignty.57 Nevertheless, court proceedings have long been a fruitful
source of state responsibility under both customary international law58 and modern
investment treaties.59
Any explanation for the treaty carve-outs given to tax measures remains tentative,
and unlikely to give complete satisfaction. However, one rationale may prove more
right than wrong. The best account for taxation’s special status probably lies in the
very nature of taxation. As mentioned earlier, tax constitutes a form of confiscation,
thus opening the way to investor arguments (however, misconceived) that an action-
able taking of property has occurred. Money leaves private hands and enters govern-
ment coffers without any necessary quid pro quo. In particular, taxes lend themselves
to characterization as a form of indirect or ‘creeping’ confiscation, which might in
56 The new generation of investment and free trade agreements now include reservations for other types of
regulatory measures in the new generation of investment treaties, particularly for environmental and
health regulation. See, eg Annex 10.11 of the Canada–Honduras Free Trade Agreement concerning indi-
rect expropriation, which provides in s (c) that ‘except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or
series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it cannot be reasonably viewed to have been
adopted and applied in good faith, a non-discriminatory measure of a Party that is designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, does not con-
stitute an indirect expropriation’.
57 Biblical scholars remember that Absalom’s revolt against his father King David started with the son’s
claim that his father was unable to put in place an effective adjudicatory mechanism. Absalom would
stand on the roadside and shout to those with pending litigation: ‘Your claims are good and right; but
there is no one deputed by the king to hear you. If only I were judge in the land! Then all who had a suit
or cause might come to me [for] justice.’ II Samuel 15 2–4. See generally Max Weber, The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (eds and trs Peter Baehr and Gordon Wells, 2002), Appendix II,
Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion, 365 (‘Modern rational capitalism requires . . . calculable
law and administration conducted according to formal rules, without which no rational private economic
business with standing capital . . . is possible.’). See also Max Weber, General Economic History trans. F.
Knight (Frank Knight tr, 1966) 277.
58 See JL Brierly, The Law of Nations (1963) 286–87, noting different views on what constitutes déni de jus-
tice. A narrow interpretation contends that denial of justice exists only when foreigners have been refused
access to courts. The broader view includes substandard judicial acts such as corruption, dishonesty, and
unwarranted delay. The term is sometimes misapplied to national court disregard of international law. In
his study, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005), Jan Paulsson rightly suggests abandonment of the
term ‘substantive’ denial of justice to describe such violations of the law of nations. See also AW
Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (1938); Ian Brownlie, Principles of
Public International Law (6th edn, 2003) 506–08.
59 See, eg Mondev International Ltd v United States of America (2002) ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/99/2,
Award of 11 October 2002 published in 42 ILM 85 (2003); Loewen Group, Inc v USA (2003) ICSID
Case No ARB (AF)/98/3, Final Award 26 June 2003, 42 ILM 811 (2003).
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principle give rise to claims under investment treaty provisions related to expropria-
tion and discrimination.60
Unlike charitable contributions or purchases of goods and services, wealth transfer
through taxation remains involuntary. Taxpayers have no option to say, ‘Sorry, we’ll
just skip this year’s contribution.’ The only escape lies in ceasing the activity that oth-
erwise triggers the tax.61
In attempting to distinguish legitimate revenue measures from de facto confisca-
tion through taxation, one is reminded of the line by US Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart reversing a movie theater’s obscenity conviction. Admitting an inabil-
ity to define ‘hard core’ pornography, Stewart added, ‘But I know it when I see it.’62
British judges sometimes apply a similar (but less risqué) characterization test. In de-
ciding that a floating crane was not a ‘ship or vessel’ for purposes of insurance policy,
Lord Justice Scrutton referred to the gentleman who ‘could not define an elephant
but knew what it was when he saw one’.63
Like elephants and obscenity, the contours of legitimate taxation leave many fuzzy
edges that frustrate rigorous discussion. Although telling them apart is not always
easy, differences do exist between what might be called ‘normal’ and ‘abusive’ taxes.
The former aims to fund government. The latter is crafted to force abandonment of
a business enterprise by ruining its economic value or to provide an investor’s com-
petitors with a beneficial fiscal framework that permits more favourable competition.
As discussed below, various treaty-based limitations come into play when an in-
vestor contends that an allegedly abusive tax violates some provision of an invest-
ment convention or free trade agreement. The relevant distinctions go far beyond
technical matters such as depreciation methods and timing of rebates, and touch on
the very notion of revenue-raising legitimacy.64
60 For a South American view on tax as indirect expropriation, see Marco Chavez, ‘La expropiacion indirecta
y el Capitulo 10 del TLC suscrito por el Peru con Estados Unidos de Norteamerica’ 4 Revista Peruana de
Arbitraje (Magna, Lima ed, 2007) 367.
61 From the perspective of a government (democracy and dictatorship alike), taxation can be compared
to payment for benefits such as roads, schools, and diplomatic protection. They need not involve either
discrimination or a design to damage the underlying business activity. Like any analogy, the compari-
son is far from perfect. Analytic problems arise when one examines the relationship between the tax
and the service. Although fiscal jurisdiction assumes some taxpayer contact with the state, the benefit
received is rarely calibrated to the fee paid. In towns where real estate taxes finance public education,
wealthy but childless homeowners pay more towards schools than modestly housed residents with
large broods.
62 See Jacobellis v Ohio (1964) 378 US 184, 197 (concurring opinion), examining when erotic expression
falls outside the limits of constitutionally protected speech. The object of inquiry was a Louis Malle film
Les Amants about a woman in an unhappy marriage. See also Paul Gewirtz, ‘On “I Know It When I See
It”’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 1023.
63 See Merchants Marine Insurance Co Ltd v North of England Protecting & Indemnity Association [1926] 26
Lloyd’s Rep 201, 203, 32 Com Cas 165, 172. In the Charente River near Rochefort, a steamship had col-
lided with the crane. If the crane was a ‘ship or vessel’, then the insurance company apparently paid
three-fourths of the damages; otherwise the damage was paid by the North of England Protecting &
Indemnity Association. See also O’Callaghan v Elliot [1966] 1 QB 601 (a Denning decision that attributes
the saying to Balfour); Cole Brothers Ltd v Phillips [1981] STC 671, 55 Tax Cases 188. The statement is
attributed to Balcombe in the article ‘Land Contracts: An Evolving Policy’ (1996) J Bus Law 39, 46.
64 See discussion below in Section 3.3.3 et seq.






/arbitration/article-abstract/36/2/157/5843840 by guest on 02 July 2020
3.3.3. The Silesian claims
Tax-related claims have not always benefited from investment protection regimes. In
the early 20th century, an arbitral tribunal took the view that fiscal measures by their
nature did not constitute an expropriation. Under this now-discredited doctrine,
investors had no general recourse to arbitration for relief from abusive taxation.
The origins of the case, Kügele v Polish State,65 lie in a part of Central Europe called
Upper Silesia, now found in the southeast corner of Poland.66 Following the First
World War, the ethnically Polish portion had become an autonomous region, while
the largely German-speaking areas remained in Germany. Following uprisings among
the Polish-speakers, part of Upper Silesia was awarded to Poland pursuant to a
Geneva Convention brokered by the League of Nations.67
To address claims by Germans for expropriation, the treaty established what
seems to be the first modern European investment protection regime, giving invest-
ors a direct cause of action against the host country.68 The Arbitral Tribunal of
Upper Silesia (officially ‘Tribunal Arbitral de la Haute Silésie’) provided an avenue for
vindication of investor rights independent of either local courts or the diplomatic
protection of the investor’s home state.
Under the label ‘license fees’ (which today might be called excise taxes), Poland
had imposed an allegedly confiscatory levy on a brewery owned by an ethnic
German, which according to the owner was forced to cease business because of the
tax. Claiming that the tax was tantamount to expropriation, the German proprietor
filed a claim for compensation.
In a 1932 decision, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the claim on the basis that taxa-
tion by definition cannot give rise to expropriation. According to the Tribunal, the
imposition of a tax implies the existence of a business, which in turn presupposes
that the enterprise has not been confiscated. The arbitral tribunal, chaired by the em-
inent Belgian Professor, Georges Kaeckenbeeck, reasoned as follows:
65 Kügele v Polish State (1932). English language summary, Case No 34, Annual Digest of Public International
Law Cases (Hersch Lauterpacht ed, 1931/1932). The terms of the relevant treaty are reproduced in Case
No 33 of the Annual Digest.
66 The adjective ‘Upper’ remains somewhat of an irony, since the region appears in the lower right corner
(the southeast) of most maps of Poland, near its borders with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Apparently labelled for its location between the ‘upper’ parts of two rivers (the Oder and the Vistula)
flowing down from the Silesian highlands, the region was alternatively under the control of Poland,
Bohemia, Austria, Prussia, and Germany. Rich in agriculture and coal, the area included towns such as
Chorzow, Katowice, and Bytom (Beutem).
67 Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922, Poland and Germany.
68 The 1922 treaty (apparently concluded only in French) can be found as an Annex in Georges
Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia: A Study in the Working of the Upper Silesia
Settlement 1922-1937 (1942). Kaeckenbeeck served as President of the Arbitral Tribunal from 1922
through 1937. See also Georges S Kaeckenbeeck, ‘Essential Human Rights’ (1946) 243 Annals Am Acad
Pol & Soc Sci 129. North America had experimented with a prototype of investment arbitration in 1794,
when the so-called ‘Jay Treaty’ (named for its American negotiator John Jay) gave British creditors the
right to arbitrate claims of alleged despoliation by American citizens and residents. See Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, London, 19 November 1794, US–UK, 8 Stat 116. Under art 6, damages for
British creditors were to be determined by five commissioners, two appointed by the British and two by
the USA. The fifth was to be chosen unanimously by the others, in default of which selection would be
by lot from between candidates proposed by each side. See generally Barton Legum, ‘Federalism,
NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794’, 18 ICSID News (Spring 2001).
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The increase of the tax cannot be regarded as a taking away or impairment of
the right to engage in a trade, for such taxation presupposes the engaging in
the trade. *** The trader may feel compelled to close his business because of
the new tax. But this does not mean that he has lost the right to engage in the
trade. For had he paid the tax, he would be entitled to go on with his
business.69
Today, such reasoning would be difficult to accept for most thoughtful observ-
ers.70 As discussed in the following section, barriers to the arbitrability of tax disputes
still exist. None of them rests on the view that fiscal measures cannot constitute a
deprivation of property. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the question of
when a tax is so burdensome as to constitute a taking is far from settled in the con-
text of international arbitration disputes.
3.3.4 The competent authority filter
To distinguish normal and abusive taxes, many investment treaties require that
claims of tax-related expropriation may be sent to arbitration only after the matter is
first referred to the two competent fiscal authorities of the host and investor states.71
For example, under NAFTA and its successor USMCA, tax authorities are given six
months to try to work things out, and together may veto any arbitration implicating
tax measures. The veto (sometimes called a ‘filter’) must be exercised jointly by both
countries, which means that the investor loses the right to file an expropriation claim
only if its own home state authorities have not been convinced to endorse the view
that the tax is confiscatory.
Under the USMCA, successor to NAFTA, Article 14.8 on Expropriation and
Compensation applies to a taxation measure, but only as between the USA and
Mexico,72 and only hemmed fore and aft by restrictions, including a bar on investor–
state arbitration of claims for ‘indirect expropriation’.73 Other restrictions include the
69 Case No 34 (n 65) 69, summarizing with excerpts from Schiedsgericht für Oberschlesian, vol III, No 1,
24 (1932).
70 Arbitral tribunals have sometimes found, depending on the circumstances, that taxes which force a busi-
ness to close may be expropriatory in nature, particularly where tax measures breached specific commit-
ments. In determining whether the expropriation provision of an OPIC insurance policy had been
triggered, the Revere Copper tribunal concluded that the Jamaican government’s repudiation of the tax sta-
bility agreement had an economic impact forcing Revere to end operations in an environment that was
no longer rational. Revere Copper and Brass Inc v Overseas Private Investment Corporation (1978) Award,
17 ILM 1321, 1331 and 1337. Addressing the circumstances needed to trigger the OPIC insurance policy,
the tribunal considered the ‘cumulative impact of the inability to make rational decisions’ asking whether
an investor must ‘wait until there has occurred something akin to the troops coming in, little by little or
all at once, in a nineteenth century sense’? The award concluded that such dramatic impact was not
necessary.
71 ECT art 21(5) provides, ‘The Investor or the Contracting Party alleging expropriation shall refer the issue
of whether the tax is an expropriation or whether the tax is discriminatory to the relevant Competent Tax
Authority.’ Compare NAFTA art 2103(6) and its successor art 32.3.8 of USMCA.
72 USMCA, art 14.2(4), and Annex 14-C allow investor–state arbitration involving Canada or Canadian
investors for up to three years after NAFTA’s termination in relation to ‘legacy investments’ established
or acquired prior to the USMCA.
73 US or Mexican investors may submit claims to arbitration under Annex 14-D (Mexico–US Investment
Disputes) ‘except with respect to indirect expropriation’. USMCA, art 14.D.3(1)(a)(i)(B). However,
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procedural requirement that claimant has first initiated proceedings before a court or
administrative tribunal of the host state, that claimant has received a final decision of
the court or 30 months have elapsed from when the first proceedings were initiated,
and that no more than four years have elapsed since the alleged breach was identi-
fied.74 One might question how this is consistent with Appendix 3 of Annex 14-D,
under which US investors may not bring arbitration against Mexico if they have al-
leged breach of obligations under USMCA Chapter 14 in proceedings ‘before a court
or administrative tribunal’. 75
With respect to the USMCA’s ‘filter’ provision (Article 32.3.8), arbitration be-
tween US and Mexican parties is permitted under Annex 14-D of the investment
chapter, but subject to a ‘filter’ of government authorization. No investor may invoke
expropriation as the basis for a claim if tax authorities of the two countries have de-
termined that the measure is not an expropriation.76 That provision requires an in-
vestor of the USA or Mexico seeking to invoke the expropriation provisions with
respect to a taxation measure first to refer to the designated authorities of the Party
of the investor and the respondent state the issue whether that measure is not an ex-
propriation. Such reference must be made when the investor files its notice of intent
to submit a claim to arbitration.
If the designated authorities do not agree to consider the issue, or fail to agree
that the measure is not an expropriation, an investor of the USA or Mexico may sub-
mit its claim to arbitration.77 The authorities will be given six months to determine
whether the relevant measure is or is not an expropriation.
Significantly in the context of US–Mexico economic relations, the USMCA con-
tains a provision on applicable ‘Customary International Law’78 which the Parties
confirm, as referenced in relation to the ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’, results
from a general and consistent practice of States implicating protection of the invest-
ments of aliens.
The ECT analogue to USMCA Article 32.3.8 says only that the competent
authorities shall ‘strive to resolve’ the issues.79 Thus, the governmental ‘meet and
confer’ process under the ECT takes on the nature of a conciliation stage followed
by binding arbitration.80
‘indirect expropriation’ claims are apparently not excluded in relation to ‘covered government contracts’
under Annex 14-E.
74 USMCA, art 14.D.5(1)(a)–(c).
75 See, eg Alan Lederman, INSIGHT: USMCA Reduces NAFTA’s Panel Reviews of Tax Cases, Bloomberg
Daily Tax Report (15 January 2019).
76 USMCA, art 32.3.8.
77 Arbitration may be requested under either Annex 14.D.3 (the general submission of expropriation claims
to arbitration) or para 2 of Annex 14.E, the Mexico/US provisions on investment disputes related to gov-
ernment contracts.
78 USMCA, Annex 14-A.
79 ECT, art 21(5)(b)(ii).
80 Debate exists on the existence and contours of a ‘futility exception’ to the referral requirement under
ECT art 21(5), by which no referral would be required if such referral would obviously be futile. The
Yukos tribunal excused the claimant investors from the referral requirement based on the exceptional cir-
cumstances of that case but other investor–state tribunals have not been interpreted as affirming the exis-
tence of a futility exception. See Green Martı́nez (n 37) 95–100.
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3.4. Illustrative case studies
3.4.1. The tale of two cases: Occidental and Encana
In his novel A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens addresses themes related to love,
justice, and sacrifice during the French Revolution. A dissolute and habitually drunk
English barrister voluntarily mounts the guillotine in Paris to save his romantic rival,
a French aristocrat wrongly condemned for crimes committed by his cruel uncle.
In so doing, the drunkard finds redemption through a noble act far better than he
had imagined himself capable.
Tax arbitration has none of the passion of the Dickens novel. However, it does
present stark contrasts of a different kind. Slight drafting differences from one treaty
to another yield dramatically different levels of investor protection.
Perhaps the most striking illustration presents itself in the different treatments of
Ecuador’s refusal to refund VAT for purchases made by two foreign oil companies,
one American and the other Canadian. The Occidental81 and Encana82 decisions
were rendered slightly more than 18 months apart, in July 2004 and February 2006,
respectively. Each addressed an oil company’s entitlement to VAT refunds on goods
and services in Ecuador.83 Each related to a ‘participation contract’ for oil and gas ex-
ploration, whereby the foreign company bore all risk and expenses in return for a
share in the production at the contract area. Each contract calculated the amount
due the company as percentages of the oil extracted based on similar factors.
Here the similarities end. In Occidental (which arose under Ecuador’s BIT with
the USA), the investor won a refund. In Encana (brought under Ecuador’s BIT with
Canada), the investor lost. The cases underscore the significance of subtle treaty
wording.84
3.4.1.1 Occidental I (2004). 3.4.1.1.1 The award. The dispute between Occidental
and Ecuador arose under the 1993 bilateral investment treaty between the USA and
Ecuador, with respect whether Occidental was entitled to obtain VAT refunds on
payments made for goods and services purchased in connection with the production
81 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador (1 July 2004). Charles Brower, Francisco
Orrego Vicu~na, and Patrick Barrera Sweeney. UNCITRAL arbitration, with LCIA serving as Registrar.
Susan Franck, Note in 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 675 (2005).
82 Encana v Republic of Ecuador (6 February 2006). James Crawford and Christopher Thomas in the major-
ity, with Horacio Grigera Naón issuing a Partial Dissenting Opinion on expropriation, reprinted 45 ILM
895 (2006) with comment by Devashish Krishan. UNCITRAL arbitration, with LCIA, serving as
Registrar.
83 Taxes were imposed on local purchases and services, as well as imports of goods.
84 For other investment cases that implicate the nuance of tax measures, see eg Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa
(n 47); Award and Dissenting Opinion of 16 December 2002, published in 42 ILM 625 (2003), finding
Mexico liable for discriminatory tax under NAFTA, which in s 2803(4) says that non-discrimination pro-
visions of art 1102 shall apply to tax measures. It is reported that the ‘tax filter’ discussed below was in
fact applied in this case, allowing two of the three expropriation claims to pass through. See also Enron
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on
Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004. El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006; Duke Energy International Peru Investments No
1, Ltd v Peru, ICSID Case No ARB/03/28, Decision on Jurisdiction of 1 February 2006; Tza Yap Shum v
Peru, ICSID Case No ARB/07/6, Award dated 7 July 2011. See generally, Yukos v Russia (n 28).
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and export of oil under the parties’ Participation Contract. Initially, Ecuador had
refunded the VAT, but later changed position. Occidental alleged that the actions of
the Ecuadorian revenue service amounted to breaches of Article II of the BIT, which
prohibits discrimination and mandates ‘fair and equitable’ treatment.
The contractual aspect of the Occidental I dispute implicated the question of
whether or not the formula for determining the oil company’s participation (referred
to as ‘Factor X’85) implicitly took into account VAT reimbursement. In other words,
did the contract fix the oil company’s revenue (calculated according to Factor X) at a
level higher than it would have been otherwise, so that the company would make
enough money to offset the payment of VAT? Was the revenue participation a ‘back
door’ form of VAT reimbursement?
The arbitral tribunal answered that question in the negative and found that
Ecuador’s denial of VAT refunds breached the treaty’s non-discrimination provision
and its duty of ‘fair and equitable’ treatment. Consequently, Ecuador was ordered to
reimburse the VAT in an amount of $71 million plus interest.
To get to this point, however, the tribunal had to decide a preliminary jurisdic-
tional matter related to Article 10(2) of the US–Ecuador BIT, which applies the
treaty to tax matters but only with respect to several limited provisions. One was ex-
propriation.86 However, the tribunal found no evidence of direct or indirect expropri-
ation and held that claim inadmissible.87
Another portion of Article 10(2) said that the treaty would apply to tax matters
with respect to ‘the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agree-
ment or authorization’.88 The arbitrators found that the Participation Contract be-
tween the host state and the investor was just such an investment agreement, and
the Factor X dispute related to that agreement. Consequently, the tribunal confirmed
its jurisdiction.89
An additional consideration was found in the introductory provision in Article
10(1) which stated that with respect to its tax policies, each country should ‘strive to
accord fairness and equity’ in the treatment of investments by the other’s nationals.
Finding that this provision was ‘not devoid of legal significance’, the arbitrators deter-
mined that its obligations were not dissimilar to the duties of ‘fair and equitable’
treatment in treaty Article II.90 The tribunal read this language as imposing an obli-
gation of fairness and equity with respect to the three categories of matters contained
in Article 10, including observance of an investment agreement.
85 The terms of ‘Factor X’ contained in Participation Contract art 8.1 (whose subheading was titled
‘Calculating Contractor Participation’) apparently contain no references to cost elements or VATs, but
simply allocate production volumes between Ecuador and Occidental, with the state participation in sub-
heading 8.5 calculated simply as the difference between the number 100 and Occidental’s participation
percentage.
86 art 10(2)(a).
87 Occidental Award of 1 July 2004, at para 92.
88 art 10(2)(c). This provision contained its own exception for claims subject to dispute settlement proce-
dures in a double tax treaty, or when such settlement provisions do not resolve the matter in a reasonable
time. A third prong of that article (art 10(2)(b)) applied the BIT to tax matters with respect to
‘transfers’.
89 Occidental Award of 1 July 2004, at para 7.
90 ibid, para 70.
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Ultimately, the arbitrators found that the failure to refund the VAT was due not
to any deliberate action, but from the arbitrariness of what they called ‘an overall
rather incoherent tax structure’.91 Consequently, Ecuador was held to have breached
its obligations to guarantee both national treatment and ‘fair and equitable’ treatment
under Article II of the treaty.
This did not end the story, however. Ecuador challenged the award in London
(the arbitral seat) under the English Arbitration Act, alleging that the arbitrators
exceeded their powers by considering the VAT matter. As discussed below, the
English courts supported both the arbitrators’ power in the particular case to con-
sider tax matters and the judiciary’s general exercise of supervisory jurisdiction over
investment arbitration.
3.4.1.1.2 The English Court Action. The 1996 English Arbitration Act contains at
least two provisions permitting courts to address arbitrators’ excess of authority, of-
ten articulated with reference to the French term excès de pouvoir or other related
notions such as ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘competence’. The first permits challenge as to ‘sub-
stantive jurisdiction’.92 For example, arbitrators appointed under a sales agreement
might decide a dispute arising under a related contract such as a guarantee. Or arbi-
trators appointed to decide a dispute with a subsidiary corporation might adjudicate
questions related to the parent entity. Questions could then present themselves as to
whether power to adjudicate controversies under one agreement permits the arbitra-
tors to address matters arising under another contract, or whether adjudicatory
power over a subsidiary allows ‘veil piercing’ to reach a shareholder. The response, of
course, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, including
the language of the relevant dispute resolution clauses.
Under English law, a second ground for challenge of arbitrator excess of authority
allows challenge for ‘serious irregularity’ which the Arbitration Act defines to include
a tribunal ‘exceeding its powers’ in some way not covered by the provision on sub-
stantive jurisdiction (noted above), but which causes ‘substantial injustice’.93 This
catch-all category could be construed to cover a variety of procedurally irregular acts
which might overlap other grounds for challenge. If an arbitrator decides a dispute
by flipping a coin, without listening to evidence, such behaviour might be deemed an
excess of authority, as well as a refusal to provide a reasonable opportunity to be
heard, thus violating the general duties of a tribunal.94
In the real world, of course, such matters often present themselves in scenarios
that prove less than straightforward, with reasonable observers diverging on whether
a decision constitutes an excess of authority or simply a ‘bad award’. Indeed, at one
point in the history of English jurisprudence, some judges took the position that
whenever a tribunal went wrong in law it strayed outside its jurisdiction.95
91 ibid, para 200.
92 1996 Arbitration Act, s 67(1).
93 ibid, s 68(2)(b).
94 ibid, ss 33 and 68(2)(a).
95 See, eg the suggestion by Alfred Thompson (Tom) Denning (albeit in an administrative context) that
‘Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is
void.’ Lord Denning, The Discipline of the Law (1979) 74. See also Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of
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In the context of the 2004 Occidental decision, Ecuador brought an action against
the award on both grounds. Each was rejected.96 Following some of the same lines
of argument as the arbitral tribunal, the court determined that the dispute fell within
the terms of Article 10(2)(c) of the treaty as it related to the observance and en-
forcement of an investment agreement. The Participation Agreement was such an
agreement, and the dispute over the meaning of ‘Factor X’ related to that agreement.
Although the investor’s claim was based on the treaty rather than a particular in-
vestment agreement, this did not prevent the tribunal from possessing jurisdiction by
virtue of the treaty provisions related to the observance of investment agreements.97
The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in a carefully reasoned opinion that
looked to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to provide guidance in the
construction of the bilateral investment treaty between Ecuador and the USA.98
Prior to addressing the jurisdictional challenge, the High Court also had to exam-
ine whether the challenge was ‘non-justiciable’ because it pertained to a treaty be-
tween two sovereigns.99 Although acknowledging that the treaty obligations derived
from public international law, the court noted that the performance of treaty-derived
rights (ie the arbitration itself) had been made subject to the municipal law of
England, permitting English courts to hear challenge to an award.100
It is important to keep in mind that the decision on ‘justiciability’ does not affect
arbitrability either way. The award addressing the VAT questions would have
remained valid even if the court had found that the BIT questions were not justicia-
ble. What would have changed was not the result of the arbitration, but simply the
judicial power to look at claims of excess of arbitral jurisdiction under the English
Arbitration Act.
3.4.1.2 Encana. 3.4.1.2.1 The majority award. The relevant jurisdictional limits
relevant to Encana can be found in Article 12 of the Canada–Ecuador BIT, which
diverges from the analogous provisions of the US–Ecuador BIT in both form and
substance.101 The opening subsection of Article 12 of the Canadian treaty states
Harrow School [1978] 3 WLR 736, 743 (CA) (‘The distinction between an error which entails absence
of jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.’). See
generally the House of Lords decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC
147, [1969] 1 All ER 208. Of course, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected this position in Lesotho
Highlands Development Authority v Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43.
96 Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
773, [2006] EWHC 345, 2006 WL 690585 (QBD (Comm Ct), decided 2 March 2006.
97 ibid, para 113.
98 Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Company [2007] EWCA Civ 656. art 31 of
the Vienna Convention takes into account factors such as the object and purpose of the treaty, while art
32 refers to ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ such as preparatory work and circumstances of
conclusion.
99 Apparently the challenge to justiciability was brought with respect to the challenge under s 67 of the
1996 Arbitration Act, but not the challenge under s 68.
100 See decision of Justice Aikens in Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration and Production Company
(OEPC) [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 240, [2005] EWHC 774 (Comm Ct), 2005 WL 1104120, upheld by the
Court of Appeal on 9 September 2005, [2005] EWCA Civ 111.
101 In addition, art 13(3)(c) of the Canada–Ecuador BIT provides that an investor may submit a matter to
arbitration only if, ‘if the matter involves taxation, the conditions specified in para 5 of Article XII have
been fulfilled’. art 12(5) states that the tax authorities of the contracting states will be given six months
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that ‘[e]xcept as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to
taxation measures.’ The treaty begins with a negative but quickly proceeds to
exceptions (including rules for expropriation102 and breach of specific contracts
with the central government103) as to which claims may be brought with respect to
tax measures.
In contrast, the American convention begins with an affirmation that ‘the treaty
shall apply to matters of taxation’ but only with respect to certain delineated meas-
ures that establish protective hedges around the general rule.
Most significant, however, was the absence of any Canadian equivalent to Article
10(1) in the US treaty, which states that the host state will ‘strive to accord fairness
and equity in the treatment of investment of nationals and companies of the other
Party’. The Canada treaty did contain a provision stating that the expropriation pro-
visions (requiring prompt, adequate, and effective compensation pursuant to Article
8) would apply to taxation measures.104 Otherwise, the only tax-related right given
the investor derived from fiscal measures that resulted in the breach of an agreement
with the host state ‘central government authorities’ in which event the measures
would be considered a claim for treaty violation.
Under the facts of the case, the majority of the tribunal found that failure to
provide a VAT refund did not constitute a breach of any agreement between the oil
company and the government of Ecuador. Moreover, no evidence persuaded the tri-
bunal majority that the failure to give a rebate constituted a de facto expropriation.105
Unlike the arbitrators in Occidental, the Encana tribunal was not able to rely on any
provision concerning fair and equitable treatment in fiscal matters.106
3.4.1.2.2 The dissent: expropriating investment returns. A partial dissent in Encana
disagreed with the majority’s view of the benefits accorded under the investment
treaty. According to the highly fact-specific dissent, the Ecuadorian Tax Court and
the Ecuadorian Congress interpreted the relevant portions of the national tax statute
in a fashion that discriminated against the oil and gas sectors of the economy and
resulted in deprivation of property in violation of Article 8 of the investment treaty.
The dissent raised an interesting distinction between investment returns as
contrasted with the investment itself, looking to the fruit rather than the tree. While
admitting that Ecuador’s behaviour did not give rise to indirect expropriation of the
investment itself, the dissent expressed a view that revenue seemed to have been
‘negatively affected’ and in essence expropriated.
to reach a joint determination that a fiscal measure does not contravene an investment agreement with
the central government or does not constitute an expropriation.
102 Canada–Ecuador BIT, art 8.
103 Canada–Ecuador BIT, art 13(3).
104 The ‘tax filter’ is applicable to expropriation claims, giving the two fiscal authorities a six-month window
to impose a joint veto by determining that a tax measure does not constitute an expropriation. See
Canada–Ecuador BIT, art12(4).
105 As noted below, the dissent considered that an expropriation had occurred to the extent that investment
returns were negatively affected by denial of VAT refunds.
106 Pursuant to art 10(1) of the US–Ecuador treaty, a host state should strive to accord ‘fairness and equity’
in treatment of investments of nationals and companies of the other Party.
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As discussed further below, differences of opinion exist with respect to the
question of when a tax affects a revenue stream so negatively as to be considered an
expropriation. In today’s world, few fiscal measures reveal themselves as confiscatory
or discriminatory on their face, for example, by taxing foreigners at rates of 100 per
cent on profits or asset value. Sound analysis usually implicates a level of sophistica-
tion concerning measures allegedly rendering business operation futile, or making
property ownership untenable.
3.4.2 Occidental II, Burlington, and Perenco
3.4.2.1 The participation sharing contract. Several investment treaty disputes have
arisen out of Ecuador’s legislation known as Law 42 (Law 2006-42), a law passed
during spikes in oil prices in 2006. Law 42 was supplemented by subsequent
decrees in 2008, culminating in a caducidad decree,107 and, in certain instances,108 by
a physical takeover of oil blocks. Law 42 replaced a specific provision of Ecuador’s
hydrocarbons law and provided for a state’s participation in unforeseen oil price ex-
cess profits.
Investors who initiated investment arbitration disputes in relation to Law 42 have
alleged that the impact that said law had on their investments violated provisions of
fair and equitable treatment and amounted to expropriation. Investors such as
Burlington, Occidental, and Perenco had entered into ‘participation sharing con-
tracts’ (PSCs) providing that the contractor was to assume the entire risk of oil ex-
ploration and exploitation, and would in exchange receive a share of the oil produced
in accordance with the allocation formulas specified in each contract.109 The PSCs
shifted the exploration and exploitation risks from the State to the contractor in or-
der to end excessive and inefficient costs incurred at the State’s expense.110 In the
107 In Spanish, caducidad literally means expiration, as in a circumstance giving rise to contract termination.
Under art 74(4) of the Hydrocarbons Law in Ecuador at the time the Burlington and similar arbitrations
were brought, the Ecuadorian Minister could declare caducidad, for example, if the Contractor unjustifi-
ably suspended operations in the Blocks for more than 30 days.
108 Burlington and Perenco are parallel cases arising out of similar facts, because Perenco was the operator of
the oil blocks and Burlington was the majority owner. In the similarly intertwined cases of Repsol and
Murphy, the facts took a different turn after the imposition of Law 42. In February 2009, Ecuador and
Repsol reached an oral agreement with the Ecuadorian government to amend the contract with respect
to Block 16. On 12 March 2009, Murphy International sold to Repsol its entire stock in Murphy
Ecuador belonging to Canam Offshore Limited, of which Murphy International was the sole owner. See
Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/
08/4; Murphy Exploration & Production Company – International v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No AA434; Repsol YPF Ecuador, SA and Others v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal
Petróleos del Ecuador (PetroEcuador), ICSID Case No ARB/08/10, which settled in February 2011.
Murphy alleged in its ICSID claim that Ecuador did not provide a fair and equitable treatment to its in-
vestment and that by breaching the contract through Law 42, violated the US–Ecuador BIT’s umbrella
clause. Murphy further argued that Ecuador violated its duty to afford full protection and security to its
investment and that Ecuador expropriated its investment. Murphy’s ICSID claim was dismissed at the
jurisdiction stage due to a finding that Murphy failed to abide by the BIT’s notification of disputes pe-
riod. Murphy then submitted another request for arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
No decision on liability has yet been rendered.
109 Burlington v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability dated 14 December 2012, para 9.
110 ibid, para 10. In the case of Occidental II, under cl 4.2 of the PSC, OEPC would no longer be reim-
bursed for its expenditures in exploring and producing Block 15 under the previous service contract
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case of Perenco and Burlington, for example, the PSCs exempted the contractor from
the payment of royalties or other additional fees. Most importantly, the PSCs con-
tained tax modification clauses, or clauses calling for the application of a ‘correction
factor’ whenever tax changes—be it tax increases or decreases—had an impact on
the economy of the contract. There was strong disagreement between the investors
and Ecuador on the meaning of the correction factor clauses; in particular, whether
the clauses were tax stabilization clauses or renegotiation clauses.111
The basic events giving rise to disputes involving Law 42 began in 2002 when oil
prices began to rise. By 2006, the price of Oriente crude reached over USD 60/bbl,
and Napo crude went over USD 50/bbl. By 2008, the price of oil surpassed the USD
100/bbl landmark for both Oriente and Napo crude from May to July, reaching
USD 121.66/bbl for Oriente crude in June 2008.112 According to Ecuador, this price
increase from 2006 to 2008 was not foreseeable and destroyed the economic stability
of the PSCs, making the allocation of oil production under the PSCs no longer fair
to Ecuador in view of the remarkable increase in oil prices. In November 2005, at a
time when the prices of Oriente and Napo crude were about USD 40/bbl, Ecuador
invited Burlington to renegotiate the terms of the PSCs. Burlington refused to do so,
arguing that the allocation of oil production was independent of the price of oil.
Moreover, according to Burlington, although PSCs could be amended under certain
circumstances, these circumstances did not include a change in oil prices.
In March 2006, following the breakdown of the renegotiations, Ecuador’s
President Palacio submitted a bill to the Ecuadorian Congress in which he proposed
an additional participation for the State of ‘at least 50%’ on the so-called extraordi-
nary profits, ie profits resulting from oil prices in excess of the price of oil as it stood
when the PSCs were executed. In the letter explaining the purposes of the bill,
President Palacio stated that the PSCs with foreign investors breached ‘the principle
of equity’ insofar as there is no clause that allows for a modification of the oil
participation share in favour of the State in case of an increase in oil prices. The over-
all purpose of the bill was ‘to restore equity’ in favour of the State. On 19 April 2006,
Congress approved President Palacio’s bill and enacted Law 42.
model. Instead, in return for accepting the obligation to explore, develop, and exploit Block 15, and be-
ing responsible for all the associated expenditures, OEPC received a share of the oil produced from
Block 15. The amount of OEPC’s participation was determined on the basis of the equation set forth in
the PSC which took into account a number of factors, including the field, the rate of production, and
certain agreed-upon percentages. At the end of 2005, OEPC’s participation was approximately 70% of
the oil produced from Block 15. Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and
Production Company v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, Award dated 5 October 2012, paras 116–
117; Perenco Ecuador Ltd v The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador
(Petroecuador), ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on
Liability dated 12 September 2014.
111 Burlington, ibid, para 21. The tax modification clause of the PSC for Block 7 (one of Burlington’s invest-
ments) provided as follows: in the event of a modification to the tax system or the creation or elimina-
tion of new taxes not foreseen in this Contract or of the employment contribution, in force at the time
of the execution of this Contract and as set out in this Clause, which have an impact on the economy of
this Contract, a correction factor will be included in the production sharing percentages to absorb the
impact of the increase or decrease in the tax or in the employment contribution burden. This correction
factor will be calculated between the Parties and will be subject to the procedure set forth in art thirty-
one (31) of the Regulations for Application of the Law Reforming the Hydrocarbons Law.
112 Burlington, ibid, paras 24, 27 and 29.
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3.4.2.2 Law 42: government 99 per cent participation. Law 42, which amended the
Hydrocarbons Law, called for state participation with respect to ‘non-agreed or
unforeseen surpluses from oil selling contracts’. Nowhere in Law 42 was the word
‘tax’ mentioned. Rather it simply called for a ‘participation’ (participación) for the
State with respect to the so-called extraordinary profits113 of foreign investors who
were parties to PSCs. On 13 July 2006, Ecuador issued Decree 1672 implementing
Law 42 at the 50 per cent rate of State participation in the so-called ‘extraordinary
revenues’ of the contractor.
On 4 October 2007, Ecuador issued Decree 662 increasing the State’s participa-
tion in those revenues to 99 per cent. In Occidental II, Perenco, and Burlington,
Ecuador eventually seized the investor’s property and took control of the oil
blocks.114
In two disputes115 brought under the Ecuador–US Bilateral Investment Treaty,
Burlington v Ecuador and Occidental (II) v Ecuador, the question of whether Law 42
and its related decrees constituted a tax took on decisive importance because of the
tax carve-out in the US–Ecuador BIT which, as described above in the context of
the Occidental I dispute, may operate as a limitation on claims for fair and equitable
treatment, subject to certain exceptions.116
The Burlington tribunal, in its 2010 decision on jurisdiction, decided that Law 42
was a tax.117 While the claimant had argued that whether Law 42 was a tax or
not depended on Ecuadorian law, the Burlington tribunal disagreed.118 The
113 On each barrel of oil sold at a price above the reference prices, therefore, Ecuador would receive the
agreed contractual percentage of the price up to the reference price and would receive 50% of the ‘ex-
traordinary income’ revenue exceeding the reference price.
114 Perenco and Burlington have brought parallel claims concerning Blocks 7 and 21 and their seizure by
Ecuador; Occidental v Ecuador(n 110) para 200; Perenco (n 110) para 256.
115 The Perenco dispute was brought under the France–Ecuador BIT, a treaty which does not have a tax
carve-out for fair and equitable treatment. The question of whether Law 42 was a tax, while having less
importance for the investor’s treaty claim, was nevertheless relevant. As a tax, Law 42 modified rights un-
der the PSCs and breached the correction factor of the PSCs. In this regard, the Perenco tribunal held
that ‘[o]n balance, having regard to its economic effect, the fact that it mandated the payment of monies
to the State in accordance with a specified formula, and Perenco’s contemporaneous characterisation of
Law 42 as a tax to which the taxation modification clauses of the Contracts applied, the Tribunal consid-
ers that Law 42 should be treated as a taxation measure.’ Perenco (n 110) para 377.
116 art X provides:
1. With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity in the treat-
ment of investment of nationals and companies of the other Party.
2. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in particular arts VI and VII, shall apply to mat-
ters of taxation only with respect to the following:
a. expropriation, pursuant to art III;
b. transfers, pursuant to art IV; or
c. the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or authorization
as referred to in art VI (1) (a) or (b), to the extent they are not subject to the dispute set-
tlement provisions of a Convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the two
Parties, or have been raised under such settlement provisions and are not resolved within a
reasonable period of time.
117 Burlington v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, dated 2 June 2010, para 167;
Burlington (n 109) para 31.
118 Burlington, Decision on Jurisdiction, dated 2 June 2010, para 161.
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Burlington tribunal concluded that the question of whether Law 42 was a tax or not
for the purpose of assessing its jurisdiction over Burlington’s treaty claims had to be
analysed under international law.
Citing Encana and Duke Energy,119 the Burlington tribunal held that it did not
matter whether or not, as a matter of Ecuadorian law, Law 42 was a tax. As observed
by the tribunal:
for purposes of jurisdiction, the Tribunal needs only to decide whether Law 42
is a tax for purposes of Article X of the Treaty under international law.
In other words, there is no point in the Tribunal determining at this stage
whether Law 42 is a tax under Ecuadorian law. In this fashion, the question of
whether Law 42 is a tax under Ecuadorian law will be decided, if it needs to be
decided, at the merits phase.120
In the Burlington Decision on Liability, there appears to have been no reconsider-
ation of the characterization of Law 42 as a tax.
The tribunal confirmed its conclusion that the investor’s fair and equitable treat-
ment claims resulting from the application of Law 42 were excluded by virtue of
Article X of the US–Ecuador BIT. Furthermore, the Burlington tribunal found that
Law 42 did not fall within the exception to the carve-out for fair and equitable treat-
ment in Article X.2(c) of the BIT, which authorizes review of matters of taxation re-
lating to ‘the observance and enforcement of the terms of an investment agreement
or authorization’.121
Whereas the Burlington tribunal focused its attention on the question of whether
Law 42 was a tax at the jurisdictional stage in a bifurcated proceeding, or, ‘in a vac-
uum’,122 before a full hearing on the merits, the Occidental II tribunal, having decided
certain jurisdictional objections launched by Ecuador at a jurisdictional stage dealing
with the core of the dispute concerning the effect of a caducidad decree on its con-
tractual rights, approached the question of whether Law 42 was a tax in determining
quantum in the final award.123 The impact of Law 42 on quantum resulted from
119 The Burlington tribunal observed in its Decision on Jurisdiction, para 164 that ‘[b]uilding on EnCana‘s
ruling, Duke Energy stands for the proposition that there is "tax" under Article X of the Treaty if the fol-
lowing four requirements are met: (i) there is a law (ii) that imposes a liability on classes of persons (iii)
to pay money to the State (iv) for public purposes. Under this definition, the Tribunal is of the view
that Law 42 is a tax.’ Citing EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, (UNCITRAL) Award dated 3
February 2006; Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No
ARB/04/19, Award dated 18 August 2008.
120 Burlington (n 117) para 163.
121 The Burlington tribunal concluded that because Burlington was not the direct party to the investment
agreement (PSC) in question a lack of privity prevented Burlington from relying on that exception.
122 In contrast, see the Yukos tribunal’s approach to bifurcation in Hulley Award, (PCA Case No AA 226)
dated 18 July 2014, para 1377, where the tribunal recalled its earlier observation in interim awards that a
decision under art 21 of the ECT would go to the ‘heart of the merits of the dispute, in that they related
to the background to and motivation behind Respondent’s tax assessments, enforcement measures and
other conduct, and that the Tribunal would not rule on these issues in a vacuum’.
123 This was due to the fact that Occidental’s main claim concerned the effect of caducidad on its rights in
the PSC, not Law 42. At the jurisdiction phase, Ecuador’s objections focused on the alleged inarbitrabil-
ity of caducidad decrees under Ecuadorian law. See Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental
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the fact that the investor contended that compensation for its losses should be
equal to the full fair market value of the PSC as of the date of the caducidad decree
of May 2006.
The Occidental II tribunal came to a very different conclusion on the nature of
Law 42 than Burlington.124 The Occidental II tribunal concluded that Ecuador’s char-
acterization of Law 42 as a tax would be ‘contrary to the plain text of Law 42’. The
Occidental II tribunal also found that Law 42 should not be characterized as a tax be-
cause it had not been enacted in accordance with the taxation procedures prescribed
by Ecuador’s Constitution. The Occidental II tribunal instead characterized Law 42
as ‘a unilateral decision of the Ecuadorian Congress to allocate to the Ecuadorian
State a defined percentage of the revenues earned by contractor companies’.125
Thus, whereas the Burlington tribunal framed the question of whether Law 42 was
a tax as an inquiry divorced from Ecuadorian law, the Occidental II tribunal judged
the factual nature of Law 42 and the factual question of whether it was a tax or not
as a matter of Ecuadorian law. The Occidental II tribunal’s analysis of Law 42 in
terms of Ecuadorian law echoes the approach of the Tza Yap Shum and Yukos tribu-
nals, discussed below, where domestic tax law and domestic tax procedures were
assessed as part of the factual matrix to determine the purpose and effect of a tax
measure under international law.126 It also echoes the approach of the Occidental I
tribunal (composed of different arbitrators dealing with different claims).127 There
the tribunal found that Ecuador’s own behaviour and interpretation of the VAT
dispute in its own courts lifted the measure outside of the meaning of a ‘tax’ for the
purpose of a tax carve-out.
The Occidental II tribunal also explored the alternative interpretation of Law 42 as
a tax. It found that ‘even if Law 42 were a tax’, it would fall within the ‘exception to
the exception’ found in Article X.2(c) of the BIT, which authorizes review of matters
Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11 (Occidental II), Decision
on Jurisdiction dated 9 September 2008, para 42. The Occidental II tribunal dismissed Ecuador’s jurisdic-
tional objections. At the liability and quantum stage, the Occidental II tribunal examined the effects of
Law 42 on damages and, therefore, had to decide whether Law 42’s effects were excluded due to the tax
carve-out in art X. See Occidental v Ecuador (n 110) para 457.
124 Occidental v Ecuador (2012) ibid.
125 ibid, para 510.
126 In the Yukos awards, for example, the tribunal concluded that the Russian Federation’s position on VAT
contradicted the Russian Federation’s justification for re-attributing taxes of the trading companies to
Yukos. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (n 28) paras 670–71. The Tza Yap Shum v Peru tribunal assessed
whether the Peruvian tax authorities had acted in accordance with Peruvian tax and administrative law
in determining whether they had disproportionate measures in breach of international law. Tza Yap
Shum (n 84) paras 218 and 237.
127 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN 3467, Award
dated 1 July 2004, paras 72–74. The Tribunal, assessing whether the challenged tax measures were ex-
cluded from its jurisdiction under a tax carve-out provision in the Ecuador–US bilateral investment
treaty, observed in para 74:
This dispute has also a very particular meaning for the parties. In spite of it having been extensively
discussed as a tax matter, a closer look might lead to the conclusion that what is really disputed is
whether there is a right to refund of taxes unchallengedly due and owing and in fact paid, and, if so,
how to achieve such reimbursement. In fact, the parties do not dispute the existence of the tax or its
percentage. What the parties really discuss is whether its refund has been secured under Factor X of
the Contract, as claimed by the Respondent, or if that is not the case, whether, as argued by the
Claimant, it should be recognized as a right under Ecuadorian Tax Law.
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of taxation relating to ‘the observance and enforcement of the terms of an investment
agreement or authorization’ (ie OEPC’s Participation Contract).128
Having determined that it had jurisdiction to review Law 42, the Tribunal
concluded that ‘by taking 50% of OEPC’s revenues from . . . production above
the agreed reference price’, Law 42 had ‘modified unilaterally and in a substantial
way the contractual and legal framework that existed at the time the claimants nego-
tiated’, and upon which they had relied in making their investment. The Occidental II
tribunal, therefore, ruled that Law 42 breached Ecuador’s treaty obligation to accord
‘fair and equitable treatment’ to OEPC’s investment, but declined to rule on whether
Law 42 breached ‘other provisions’ of the BIT. Most significant in terms of the
investor’s victory, in this case, was that the Occidental II tribunal refused to factor
Law 42 into its valuation of OEPC’s assets for damages purposes.
The Perenco tribunal had to examine Law 42 not for the purpose of determining
whether a treaty tax carve-out applied, but in terms of deciding whether the law
breached the tax modification provisions of the PSCs. The Perenco tribunal deter-
mined that Law 42 was a tax that breached Ecuador’s contractual obligations under
the PSCs.
The Perenco tribunal concluded that Decree 662 (Law 42 amended with a 99-per
cent participation on extraordinary revenues) constituted an act of coercion when
viewed within the context of the parties’ contractual relations and could thus be
regarded as a ‘deviation of power’. The tribunal stated that its reliance on that expres-
sion (‘deviation of power’) derived from Ecuadorian law.
The tribunal further decided that the application of Decree 662, and statements
of senior officials, signalled a new phase in the State’s relationship with Perenco and
other similarly situated oil companies. The tribunal considered the disruption of the
contractual relationship by price increases to rise to an unanticipated magnitude.
According to the tribunal, the 99-per cent measure converted the Participation
Contracts into de facto service contracts, thus breaching initial agreements.129 The
Perenco tribunal also concluded that the 99-per cent windfall tax triggered a series
of measures which, according to the tribunal, were coercive and abusive and, thus,
violated the obligation to afford fair and equitable treatment under the France–
Ecuador BIT.
3.4.2.3 The Decrees Qua Expropriation. The next question facing tribunals hearing dis-
putes involving Ecuador’s Law 42 was whether Law 42 itself, or any of its subsequent
decrees, amounted to an expropriation. In the Burlington case, the investor alleged
that Ecuador expropriated its investment through a series of measures, beginning
with the imposition of Law 42, and ending with the physical takeover of the blocks.
Burlington maintained that these measures constituted an unlawful expropriation of
its investment both individually and in the aggregate.
Burlington argued that both the purpose and effect of Law 42 were expropriatory.
The purpose of Law 42, as expressed by Ecuador’s own congressional debate, was to
re-write the terms of the PSCs through legislation. Burlington argued that Law 42
128 Occidental v Ecuador (n 110) para 499.
129 Perenco (n 110) paras 407, 409, 411, 593 and 606.
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resulted in a direct expropriation of its contractual rights in the PSCs, rights that
formed part of the definition of investment in the US–Ecuador treaty. In addition,
Burlington argued that the economic impact of Law 42 was a substantial deprivation
of its investment.130
In terms of the purpose of Law 42 as a tax, the Burlington tribunal considered that
Law 42 affected the economy of the PSCs and that Ecuador failed to apply a correc-
tion factor pursuant to the tax absorption clauses and further held that Ecuador
breached the tax absorption clauses of the PSCs. All of this, the Burlington tribunal
concluded, was relevant, although by no means decisive, consideration for purposes
of the expropriation analysis, which entails a broader inquiry into the investment’s
overall capacity to generate commercial returns for the benefit of the investor.
Thus, notwithstanding the illegality of the purpose of Law 42 as a tax designed to
force an abdication of contractual rights, the Burlington tribunal determined that said
purpose was not sufficient to characterize Law 42 as an expropriation. Rather, what
mattered was the economic impact that Law 42 had on Burlington’s investments.
The Burlington tribunal went further, stating, as a matter of general international
law, that a wrongful purpose in a tax, such as a discriminatory purpose, could only be
an expropriation if it resulted in a substantial deprivation. In passing, an observer
might ask whether such a statement accurately represents international law. A tax im-
posed only on the basis of ethnicity or religion, for example, might constitute a
wrongful confiscation.131
The Burlington tribunal, in explaining why the economic impact of the tax mat-
tered more than its purpose, began by observing that it was highly doubtful that a
windfall profits tax could ever constitute an expropriation because ‘[b]y definition,
such a tax would appear not to have an impact upon the investment as a whole, but
only on a portion of the profits.’132
Nevertheless, before dismissing the question of whether Law 42’s economic im-
pact could ever be considered expropriatory, the tribunal asked ‘whether Law 42, first
at 50% and then at 99%, amounted to an expropriation of Burlington’s investment’
in terms of economic impact.133
In respect to the impact of Law 42 at 50 per cent, the tribunal concluded that in
relative terms:
130 Burlington (n 109) paras 114, 254, 337, 402 and 419.
131 Even if Nazi taxes on Jewish-owned assets did not confiscate 100% of the relevant property, such dis-
criminatory decrees could constitute unlawful takings. The Suhneleistung (‘atonement payment’), also
known as the Jewish Capital Levy, was enacted on 12 November 1938, imposing a tax of 20% (later
25%) on the registered assets of the Jews. See generally Richard Epstein, Takings (1985) ch 18, 283–
305. AR Albrecht, ‘The Taxation of Aliens under International Law’ (1952) XXIX British Yearbook of
International Law, 173. According to Albrecht, ‘confiscation in the guise of taxation cannot be permitted
when confiscation itself is prohibited’, ibid. According to the late Sir Ian Brownlie, ‘Taxation which has
the precise object and effect of confiscation is unlawful.’ Sir Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law (7th edn, 2008) 532.
132 The Perenco tribunal made a similar observation with respect to windfall profit taxes, observing that
‘[w]hile like any other windfall tax, Law 42 reduced Perenco’s profitability, it did not deprive the
Claimant of its rights of management and control over the investment in Ecuador, nor did it reach the
requisite level of a substantial diminution in the value of that investment.’ Perenco (n 110) para 672.
133 Burlington (n 109) paras 419, 425, 426, 429, 430 and 450.
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Law 42 at 50% reduced Burlington’s take on the total oil revenues (after taxes
and including operating costs) produced by the Blocks from 48.9% to 34.6%
in Block 7 (a 29.2% reduction), and from 57.4% to 38.6% in Block 21
(a 32.8% reduction). If Burlington’s operating costs are subtracted from its rev-
enues, Law 42 at 50% reduced Burlington’s take on total oil revenues from
38.3% to 24% in Block 7 (a 37.3% reduction), and from 48.6% to 29.9%
(a 38.5% reduction) in Block 21.
The tribunal further observed that Law 42 at 50 per cent reduced Burlington’s
net profits by around 40 per cent (USD 23 million out of a total of USD 56.14 mil-
lion). In addition, Law 42 diminished Burlington’s net profits by around 62.9 per
cent in 2007 (USD 52.64 million out of USD 83.6 million). On the basis of those fig-
ures among other evidence, the tribunal concluded that the effects of Law 42 at
50 per cent did not amount to a substantial deprivation of the value of Burlington’s
investment. Next, the Burlington tribunal turned to whether Law 42 at 99 per cent
constituted an expropriation. The tribunal concluded that:
Law 42 at 99% reduced Burlington’s take on the total oil revenues produced
by the Blocks – after taxes but including operating costs – from 48.9% to
20.5% in Block 7 (a 58% reduction), and from 57.4% to 17.1% in Block 21
(a 70.2% reduction). This approach confirms that Law 42 at 99% considerably
diminished Burlington’s profits, but does not prove that Burlington’s invest-
ment became unprofitable or worthless.
In other words, for the Burlington tribunal, the Pope & Talbot ‘substantial depri-
vation’ test for expropriation had to result in rendering an investment worthless or
unprofitable. According to the Burlington tribunal, Law 42 did not reach the level of
a substantial deprivation.
The Perenco tribunal, like Burlington, focused on the economic impact of Law 42
and its subsequent decrees. As in the case of Burlington, the Perenco tribunal came to
the conclusion that as long as the investor could operate and pay bills, it was not
expropriated. Specifically, the Perenco tribunal held that ‘the financial burden of pay-
ing 99% of the revenues above the reference price, while disadvantageous to
Perenco, did not bring its operation to a halt or, to revert to the tests previously
cited, effectively neutralise the investment or render it as if it had ceased to exist’.134
The findings of the Perenco and Burlington tribunals seem to support a view that
in tax cases, investment arbitral tribunals require a substantial or even total economic
deprivation more than simply abusive or illegal intent.135 The economic effects-
134 Perenco (n 110) para 685.
135 Ilias Bantekas and Ali Lazem, The Treatment of Taxation as Expropriatory in International Investor-State
Arbitration (OUP 2015) online, aiv030 <https://doi.org/10.1093/arbint/aiv030>; hard copy version
in 35 Arbitration International 2019. Economic coercion has been found to constitute an act of unlawful
expropriation. See, eg CME v Czech Republic, Partial Award dated 13 September 2001, para 591, where
the tribunal found that ‘[w]hat was destroyed was the commercial value of the investment in CNTS by
reason of coercion exerted by the Media Council against CNTS in 1996 and its collusion with Dr.
Zelezny in 1999.’
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based approach of the Perenco and Burlington tribunals is generally in line with
the USA’ view of ‘takings’, which have been found to occur when government regula-
tions have a substantial negative economic effect on private interests.136 When
American courts address the matter of regulatory takings, they ask what governmen-
tal actions might be the functional equivalent of traditional government ouster of
owners from their property.137
While the Burlington and Perenco tribunals asked whether Law 42 was the
functional equivalent of a physical taking of property or shutdown of operations, the
approach of the Yukos tribunal, as discussed below, focused more on illegal motive.
The difference between ‘effects-focused’ and ‘motive-based’ approaches may prove
significant in deciding whether a tax should be considered as a legitimate fiscal
measure.138
3.4.3 The Yukos saga
3.4.3.1 The dispute and the Awards. In relation to tax measures implicating takings of
foreign investment, perhaps the best-known case involves OAO Yukos Oil Company
(‘Yukos’), one of the largest oil companies in Russia before its bankruptcy in 2006.
The Russian revenue authorities imposed substantial taxes and fines for alleged fiscal
evasion, allegedly to remove from the political arena the company’s controlling
shareholder, Mr Mikhail Khodorkovsky.139
Ultimately, some non-Russian shareholders of Yukos initiated arbitration proceed-
ings after failing to settle the dispute within the prescribed period under the ECT. In
2007, the shareholders filed at the PCA claims for which US$50 billion was awarded
seven years later. There were in fact three Yukos arbitrations with 2014 awards ren-
dered against the Russian Federation in favour of Hulley Enterprises, Yukos
Universal Limited, and Veteran Petroleum Limited, finding that Russia’s conduct
had constituted an assault on Yukos and its beneficial owners in order to bankrupt
Yukos and appropriate its assets.140
Claimants asserted that the Russian Federation failed to treat claimants’ invest-
ments in Yukos in a fair and equitable manner and on a non-discriminatory basis and
expropriated claimants’ investments in breach of its obligations under Articles 10(1)
and 13(1) of the ECT, therefore entitling claimants to full damages.
Article 10(1) of the ECT provides, inter alia, that all parties to the treaty shall ‘en-
courage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for
136 For example, US Constitution art V provides that ‘private property [shall not] be taken for public use
without just compensation’.
137 Lingle v Chevron USA Inc (2005) 544 US 528.
138 In the Methanex case, a ban on the MTBE gasoline additive had a substantial impact on the viability of
Methanex’s business. However, the tribunal found that the purpose underlying the ban was not to de-
prive Methanex of its investment, nor was it discriminatory. Methanex Corporation v United States of
America (UNCITRAL) Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005, 44 ILM
1345.
139 See generally, Ruth Teitelbaum, ‘What’s Tax Got to Do with It? The Yukos Tribunal’s Approach to
Motive and Treaty Interpretation’ (2015) 12(5) Transnational Dispute Management (TDM,
OGEMID).
140 Awards of 18 July 2014 in Hulley Enterprises Limited (n 28); Yukos Universal Limited (n 28); Veteran
Petroleum Limited (n 28) para 515.






/arbitration/article-abstract/36/2/157/5843840 by guest on 02 July 2020
Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area’. The treaty
also provides for investments to be accorded ‘fair and equitable treatment’ not to be
impaired by ‘unreasonable or discriminatory measures’ that interfere with manage-
ment, maintenance enjoyment, or disposal of the asset.
Russia asserted that its tax authorities found Yukos to have evaded billions of
rubles in Russian taxes by misrepresenting profits, requiring tax assessments to be
satisfied by the auction of assets to satisfy fiscal obligations following the tax evasion.
In contrast, claimants argued that Russia singled out Yukos, treating the company in
a markedly different manner from other similarly situated oil companies in Russia.
Moreover, differential treatment in the bankruptcy proceedings was alleged, as be-
tween creditors related to Yukos, on the one hand, and state-related creditors, on the
other. In reply, Russia argued that its disputed measures were taken in accord with
international standards, were reviewed and upheld by the Russian courts, and repre-
sented a legitimate exercise of state taxation power.141
Article 13(1) of the ECT prohibits expropriation and defines ‘expropriation’ as a
measure ‘having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation’, except when it
is ‘(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) car-
ried out under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by the payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation’. The claimants said that none of the four con-
ditions were satisfied under the international legal standards; thus, the contested
measure constituted ‘expropriation’ which resulted in the deprivation of their invest-
ments, and therefore a violation of the ECT. In response, Russia argued that meas-
ures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation must be shown to
establish their claim under Article 13(1). The respondent claimed that as the tax
strategy that Yukos used was an illegal tax evasion scheme under Russian law, which
accords with the international legal standard, thus the respondent was exercising
legitimate police power.
The arbitral tribunal unanimously declared that Respondent had breached its
obligations under Article 13(1) of the ECT. The arbitral tribunal, however, found
that although Russia had not explicitly expropriated the shareholders, the measures
taken by Russia, in fact, had an effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation,
with the four conditions in Article 13(1) of the ECT not having been met. The result
was a cost-free takeover by the state-owned oil company, Rosneft, which could
not be seen as in the public interest or comporting with the due process of law.
Nor had there been ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’ paid to the
claimants.
In an interim award issued earlier, on 30 November 2009, the arbitral tribunal
had upheld its jurisdictional authority, subject to joinder of two jurisdictional issues
on the merits phase.142 The jurisdictional issue decided in that interim award related
141 Yukos Universal Limited, ibid, para 109 (quoting from Respondent’s Skeleton Argument).
142 Those two reserved matters related to (i) whether claimants’ allegedly illegal conduct deprived them of
protection under the ECT (an ‘unclean hands’ objection) and (ii) whether the tribunal had competence
with respect to ‘Taxation Measures’ other than those based on expropriatory taxes, as provided under
ECT art 21. As noted below, ECT art 21 provides a general rule that ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall create
rights or impose obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties.’ The same
Article then enumerates provisions that will apply to tax measures, including prohibitions against
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to ECT application on a provisional basis, following Russian signature on 17
December 1994, even without ratification, thus benefiting investments made during
the period of provisional application. Russia had argued that it could only apply pro-
visionally those treaty provisions consistent with Russian law, which did not include
the dispute resolution clauses. Yukos shareholders contended that Russia remained
bound by the ECT under Article 45, which allows application of the ECT on a provi-
sional basis.
The arbitral tribunal found that provisional application of the ECT was an ‘all-or-
nothing’ matter. In other words, Russia could not pick between some treaty items
whose provisional application might be consistent with Russian law, and some that
might not. Provisional application covered the ECT treaty as a whole, which
was found not inconsistent with Russian law. A keyword in the arbitral tribunal’s
reasoning was the ‘such’ in Article 45(1) of the ECT, allows a country’s provisional
application of the treaty only if ‘such provisional application is not inconsistent with
its constitution, laws or regulations’ (emphasis added). According to the arbitral tri-
bunal, the ‘such’ implied application of the treaty as a whole, not particular items
such as arbitration provisions.
3.4.2.2 Dutch annulment and reinstatement of the awards. These awards were ulti-
mately annulled in the Netherlands, at the seat of the proceedings, by the Hague
District Court on the basis that no valid arbitration agreement existed to support ju-
risdiction by the PCA tribunal under the ECT. A District Court in The Hague on 20
April 2016 annulled the awards on jurisdictional grounds, expressing a view that un-
der Russian law, private entities could not normally arbitrate with state entities.
Yukos shareholders appealed the decision of the Hague District Court. On 18
February 2020, as this note goes to press, the Court of Appeal reinstated the award,
overturning the District Court jurisdictional findings.143 The decision implicated an
analysis of Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1065, as well as the ECT provi-
sions related to a state’s consent to be bound. The Court of Appeal considered the
commitment to arbitrate created when the Russian Federation signed the ECT on
17 December 1994, interpreted in light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, provide for attention to the text of the treaty as
well as a principle of good faith.144
discrimination and uncompensated expropriation, for which investors may seek redress through arbitra-
tion. The non-discrimination rule, however, excludes from its application both income and capital taxes,
as well as tax collection measures.
143 Press reports of this appellate procedure appeared in various sources. Appellate Court decision has
appeared inter alia The Economist (‘Putin v The Oligarchs: How One World in a Treaty Could Cost
Russia Billions for Seizing Yukos’ The Economist (16 February 2020) <http://www.economist.com/
news/business/21696960-russia-trying-impede-enforcement-massive-damages-award-baiting-bear>. For
a report on the appellate decision itself, see Financial Times, 19 February 2020, reports by Henry Foy
and Michael Peel. The arbitration Press on 18 February 2020 reported the Hague appellate decision, eg
in Global Arbitration Review, in a report Tom Jones titled Russia Reels as Yukos Awards are Revived.
144 Marike Paulsson, ‘Revival of the Yukos Awards Against Russia Following the Decision of 18 February by
the Court of Appeal in the Hague’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 22 February 2020) <http://arbitrationblog.
kluwerarbitration.com/2020/02/22/revival-of-the-yukos-awards-against-russia-following-the-decision-of-
18-february-by-the-court-of-appeal-in-the-hague>.
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The final word will lie with the Dutch Supreme Court, on the Russian Federation
filing of an appeal. In the interim, shareholders of Yukos may pursue proceedings to
enforce the PCA decisions in jurisdiction, including the UK, the USA, France,
Belgium, Germany, and India.145
3.5 Confiscation and tax: when do fiscal measures go too far?
Recent disputes involving tax measures and investor–state cases raise the interesting
question of what constitutes a confiscatory tax on its face. In this context, one might
return to the quotation of Justice Holmes that served as epigraph to this essay: taxes
are what we pay for civilized society.146 The statement appeared in a case decided at
a time when the Philippine islands were an American colony. A local tax had been
levied on fire insurance premiums paid by a Spanish tobacco company to English
and French insurers. The majority opinion by Chief Justice Taft held the taxes to be
invalid. ‘[A]s a state may not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of
law’, reasoned Taft, ‘it may not compel any one within its jurisdiction to pay tribute
to it for contracts or money paid to secure the benefit of contracts made and to be
performed outside of the state’.147
Justice Holmes disagreed in a dissent that bears closer scrutiny. ‘It is true’, wrote
Holmes, ‘that every exaction of money for an act is a discouragement to the extent of the
payment required’.148 He continued, however, by noting that ‘there may be a difficulty
in deciding whether an imposition is a tax or a penalty. While noting that the intent
to prohibit activity may be plainly expressed, Holmes concluded that sometimes a tax
may be ‘shown to be a penalty by its excess in amount over the tax in similar cases.149
This last expression, the ‘excess in amount over the tax in similar cases’, lies at the
heart of distinctions between normal and abusive taxes. The test looks not only to
the way the fiscal legislation is drafted but also to the fashion in which the measures
are implemented, comparing how taxpayers are treated when in similar circumstan-
ces. While not likely to address all situations of abusive taxation, the ‘similar cases’
test serves as a useful starting point for identifying taxes intended to expropriate
assets rather than raise revenue.
145 Yet another aspect of the Yukos saga has been reported in connection with a Swedish decision, where
the Svea Court of Appeal set aside a Stockholm Chamber of Commerce award in favour of the Spanish
investors in the Quasar de Valores arbitration (formerly known as Renta4), putting an end to a case that
has been running for several years. The 2012 award in Quasar de Valores was issued by a Stockholm-
seated tribunal chaired by Jan Paulsson, with Charles Brower and Toby Landau QC as co-arbitrators.
The award found that Russia’s actions with regard to Yukos were in breach of art 6 of the Spain–Russia
bilateral investment treaty on expropriation and that the state should pay compensation.
146 Compa~nı́a General de Tabaco de Filipinas (n 54).
147 ibid 95.
148 It was in this context that Holmes characterized taxes as ‘what we pay for civilized society, including the
chance to insure’.
149 ibid 100–01. With respect to the specific tax at issue, Holmes continues, ‘But here an act was done in
the Islands that was intended by the plaintiff to be and was an essential step towards the insurance, and,
if that is not enough, the government of the Islands was protecting the property at the very moment in
respect of which it levied the tax.’
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For example, taxes imposed only on people of a particular religion or race would
normally be suspect, even if levied at very low rates.150 However, the same tax (or
one at a much higher rate) would pass muster if all creeds and colours were required
to pay equally.151
Not every discriminatory tax will lack legitimacy, however. For administrative con-
venience, most countries impose special fiscal burdens on non-resident aliens and
foreign corporations. As mentioned earlier, these include a tax on gross receipts
(rather than net income) for investment returns such as dividends, interest, and roy-
alties received by non-resident aliens, as well as taxes on the gross amount received
from real property gains and taxes on branches of foreign corporations that are not
imposed on domestic entities.152
3.6 Tax arbitration and economic prosperity
Arbitration can play a significant role in reducing the prospect of both ‘hometown
justice’ and ‘gunboat diplomacy’ as twin triggers to dampen prospects for economi-
cally beneficial exchanges. Thus, enhancing reliability and impartiality in cross-border
dispute resolution, arbitration can serve the long-term expectations of governments
and business managers alike.
Notwithstanding that such an approach has long seemed non-controversial to
thoughtful observers, not all would agree. For whatever reason, politicians of several
stripes have advanced problematic rhetoric criticizing investor–state dispute resolu-
tion of the type which provides a fair resolution of tax-related conflicts. For example,
such scepticism has been expressed by President Trump’s appointee as US Trade
Representative, Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, in exchanges with Congressman
Kevin Brady, who raised concern that investor–state dispute resolution would result
in lost sovereignty and facilitate business plants moving overseas.153
150 As has been discussed above, the Burlington Decision on Liability concluded that a discriminatory tax
could only be expropriatory if imposed as a substantial deprivation.
151 See generally, Epstein (131) ch 18, 283–305. Professor Epstein distinguishes various forms of taxation
(such as special assessments, progressive income taxes, and estate/gift taxation), with particular attention
to proposals for the so-called ‘flat tax’ discussed in the USA from time to time.
152 On the branch profits tax, see US Internal Revenue Code, s 884, which is so patently aimed at foreigners
that it can trigger application of anti-discrimination prohibitions of income tax treaties.
153 On 21 March 2018, during a House Ways & Means Committee hearing, Mr Lighthizer suggested as follows:
‘We are skeptical about ISDS [Investor–State Dispute Resolution] for a variety of reasons . . ..
Number one, on the U.S. side there are questions of sovereignty. **** On the outgoing side,
there are many people who believe that in some circumstances, and I can discuss the varieties,
that in some circumstances it’s more of an outsourcing issue. So what is it? It’s a situation where
somebody says “I want to move a plant from Texas and I want to put it in Mexico; and when I
go down there, I don’t want to take the political risk that AMLO is going to win in Mexico and
change my bargain. So I want the U.S. government essentially to buy political risk insurance for
me.” **** Our view was that rather than have this mandatory ISDS provision, which we think is
a problem in terms of our sovereignty in the United States, encourages outsourcing and losing
jobs in the United States, and by the way lowering standards in a variety of places, that we
should be very careful before we put something like that into place.’
<https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/brady-lighthizer-isds-exchange.html>.
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On the other side of the political spectrum, Senator Elizabeth Warren
of Massachusetts has joined the negative assessment, both in a newspaper
publication154 and in exchanges with US government officials.155Similar
views have been expressed by Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Hillary
Clinton.156
Sentiment against treaty-based investment arbitration has also been evidenced in
Europe, as manifested in the landmark decision of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) in the now well-known Achmea decision, where the ECJ held that an arbitra-
tion provision, in a treaty between two European Union (EU) Member States,
154 Elizabeth Warren, Washington Post, 25 February 2015, Opinion, “‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause
Everyone Should Oppose.”’ The Washington Post (25 February 2015). After raising the spectere of for-
eign companies causing damage by toxic chemicals, and then avoiding American law through interna-
tional arbitration, Senator Warren asks, “‘What’s so wrong with the U.S. judicial system? Nothing,
actually.”’ And of course, she would likely be correct from the perspective of Americans. One wonders,
however, whether a similar perspective would be shared by companies from the USAnited States inves-
ting in Russia or China or even less exotic venues <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-
the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term¼.9b9236872987>.
155 See Senator Warren’s letter to Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, US Trade Representative, 19 September
2017, suggesting inter alia that:
NAFTA’s investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS") provisions tilt the playing field even further
in favor of large corporations, all while undermining United States sovereignty and leading to
corporate offshoring. **** ISDS provisions allow foreign corporations to challenge U.S. laws
without ever stepping foot in a U.S. court. Instead, foreign companies who do business in the
U.S. are given a free pass to ignore our rules and bypass our courts - a privilege not extended to
the millions of Americans living in this country.
<https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017_09_19_NAFTA_ISDS_letter.pdf>.
Regarding NAFTA’s successor, the USMCA, although her views on ISDS seem unchanged, Senator
Warren has voiced support for the revised version of the treaty, invoking enhanced labour protections
and the interests of farmers, despite continued availability of ISDS under the USMCA. The Boston
Globe, ‘Why Elizabeth Warren Came Around on Trump’s Trade Deal’ (6 January 2020) <https://
www.boston.com/news/politics/2020/01/06/elizabeth-warren-trump-trade-deal>.
156 On 20 April 2016, in response to questions about the international trade partnership agreements,
Senator Clinton replied, ‘With respect to the flawed ISDS provisions in TPP [the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement] which I even wrote about in my book – I think we need to have a new para-
digm for trade agreements that doesn’t give special rights to corporations that workers and NGOs don’t
get’ <https://toddntucker.com/2016/04/20/clinton-and-sanders-go-deep-on-isds/>. Senator Sanders’
answered: ‘The TPP creates a special dispute resolution process that allows corporations to challenge
any domestic laws that could adversely impact their ‘expected future profits. These challenges would be
heard before UN and World Bank tribunals which could require taxpayer compensation to corporations.
This process undermines our sovereignty and subverts democratically passed laws including those deal-
ing with labor, health, and the environment. As president, I will not approve any trade agreement that
gives foreign corporations the right to undermine American democracy through the disastrous Investor
State Dispute Settlement system.’ The Sanders quote is available at the following link, which contains
his responses to a questionnaire: <https://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/pennsylvania/files/2016/04/
PAFTCPresidentialQuestionnaire_Sanders2016.pdf>.
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should be deemed incompatible with EU law,157 although the logic of that approach
appears to be far from universally accepted in tax contexts, even within the EU.158
Putting aside rhetoric, one assumption of some attacks on investment arbitration has
been that the host state (usually the respondent) will lose to the investor. While investors
do sometimes win, they can also lose, as illustrated by two recent arbitral awards with tax
implications. One of these cases involved Poland, and the other involves Uzbekistan.
The first case, a federal court decision involving Poland,159 implicated allegations
by American investors that the Polish government arbitrarily enforced its tax law
against a company in which a predecessor of the claimant ‘Schooner Capital’ held a
majority interest. After Poland retroactively enacted fiscal reporting requirements
that the company could not comply with, seven criminal investigations were filed
over a half-dozen years, with approximately 55 million zlotys (now about $14.4 mil-
lion) to be paid in taxes and penalties. As a result, the company went bankrupt. The
investors had filed for arbitration in Paris, under the terms of a 1994 treaty between
the USA and Poland.
An arbitral tribunal consisting of three well-known arbitrators (Makhdoom Ali
Khan of Pakistan, the late Professor Francisco Orrego Vicu~na of Chile, and Professor
Claus von Wobeser of Mexico) rendered an award on 24 November 2015, rejecting
most of the investors’ claims and ordering payment of net costs incurred by the state
in an amount of US$2,640,447. On 2 April 2019, the Cour d’appel de Paris, which
had heard an application to vacate the award, issued a decision rejecting the motion
for award annulment.160 In an action brought by Poland to collect the costs assessed
against the investors, the Federal court in Massachusetts stayed the enforcement ac-
tion brought by Poland, pending the final outcome in France pursuant to appeal to
157 ECJ Case C-284, Slovak Republic v Achmea (6 March 2018) (published in Official Journal on 20 April
2018). As part of a reform of its health system, the Slovak Republic opened its market to both national
operators and operators of other Member States offering private sickness insurance services. Achmea, an
undertaking belonging to a Netherlands insurance group, set up a subsidiary in Slovakia through which it
offered sickness insurance. In 2006, the Slovak Republic partly reversed the liberalization of the private in-
surance market, and in 2007 prohibited the distribution of profits generated by private sickness insurance
activities. Achmea brought arbitration proceedings against the Slovak Republic in 2008 pursuant to art 8 of
the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Slovakia and the Netherlands. As permitted under the BIT, the
Dutch claimant opted for the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, before an arbitral tribunal in Frankfurt. An
award of e22 million in favour of Achmea was challenged in an unsuccessful annulment action, with a sub-
sequent appeal to the German BGH (Bundesgerichtshof), which decided to stay the action with referral of
key questions to the ECJ, which ultimately found that the investor–state arbitration clause in the Dutch–
Slovak BIT was incompatible with EU law because it violated the principle of autonomy.
158 See ‘Resolution of Tax Disputes in the European Union’, EU Council Directive of 10 October 2017,
proposing resolution of tax disputes by ‘Advisory Commissions’ or ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution
Commissions’ composed of ‘independent persons of standing’ effective as of July 2019. Although com-
petent authorities may take decisions that depart from the opinion of an Advisory Commission or
Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission, failure to reach agreement will result in their being bound
by the relevant opinion.
159 Republic of Poland v Vincent Ryan, Schooner Capital and Atlantic Investment Partners, US District Court,
District of Massachusetts, 28 May 2019, Civil Action No 1:18-cv-12382-RGS. Federal Judge Stearns,
looking to the 1958 New York (United Nations) Arbitration Convention, granted the investors’ motion
to stay recognition and enforcement of an award made in Paris pending resolution of the investors’ ap-
peal to the Cour de cassation.
160 Cour d’Appel de Paris, Pôle 1 - Chambre 1, Arrêt 2 avril 2019, N RG 16/24358 P.
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the Cour de cassation. As a condition for such stay, the court required the investors
to post a bond from the date of the award until December 2020.
The other case implicated an investment in Uzbekistan by now-defunct Oxus
Gold Mining PLC,161 following a US$13 million award (approximately $10 million
plus interest) which although against the host state, did not meet the expectations of
the British investor, which had sought US$1.2 billion. The award had been con-
firmed by the Cour d’Appel in Paris, the seat of the arbitration. As in the case involv-
ing Poland, the American court stayed the enforcement action pending final
resolution of the matter in France.
4 . T A X T R E A T I E S A N D T H E M A P 1 6 2
4.1. The double tax concern
Traditional bilateral income tax treaties address several concerns. The taxpayer
wishes to avoid double taxation, which as discussed below will often implicate the
same income being taxed to the same entity by two different countries. As discussed
below, in addition to such ‘juridical’ double taxation (two taxes on the same juridical
person), the international fiscal system must also be concerned with ‘economic’ dou-
ble taxation where the profits within a multinational group might be taxed in one
country without an appropriate deduction in another. For example, a royalty in-
cluded in the income of the parent licensor (in one nation) should normally be offset
by a deduction in the country of the subsidiary paying the royalty fee. Yet such sym-
metry often proves elusive in practice.
At the same time, however, the taxing authorities have a legitimate interest in re-
ducing instances where transactions among members of a multinational group result
in erosion of the tax base through improper intra-group shifting of profits.
In respect of both concerns, tax treaties have pursued, with differing measures of
vigour, the notion of ‘mutual agreement’ between different countries’ tax authorities,
with arbitration as a backstop when negotiations fail to produce a bargain acceptable
to both sides. The first OECD Model Tax Convention in 1963 set forth an ‘MAP’,
which in Article 25 required a competent authority to ‘endeavor’ to derive a solution,
without any option of arbitration as an ultimate form of recourse.163 Subsequently,
treaties included MAP mechanisms directing negotiation, with binding arbitration as
an option for competent authorities: a permissive ‘may’ but not a mandatory ‘must’
161 Gretton Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan (2019) Docket 2018cv01755 (DDC). The name of the American
decision derives from the third-party funder of the arbitration, successor in interest to Oxus.
162 See generally Michelle Markham, ‘The Comparative Dimension Regarding Approaches to Decision-
making in International Tax Arbitration’ in John H Farrar, Vai Io Lo and Bee Chen Goh (eds),
Scholarship, Practice and Education in Comparative Law: A Festschrift in Honour of Mary Hiscock (2019)
ch 7, 115; Michelle Markham, ‘Litigation, Arbitration and Mediation in International Tax: An
Assessment of Whether This Results in Competitive or Collaborative Relations’ (2018) 11(2) Contemp
Asia Arbitr J 277; Michelle Markham, ‘Mandatory Binding Tax Arbitration: Is This a Pathway to a More
Efficient Mutual Agreement Procedure’ (2019) 35(2) Arb Int’l 149. Hans Mooij, ‘Tax Treaty
Arbitration’ (2019) 35(2) Arb Int’l 195; Jake Heyka, ‘A World Tax Court: The Solution to Tax Treaty
Arbitration’ (Tax Analysis, 15 August 2016); PK Sidhu, ‘Is the Mutual Agreement Procedure Past Its
“Best Before Date” and Does the Future of Tax Dispute Resolution Lie In Arbitration?’ (22 October
2014) IBFD Bulletin for International Taxation No 11, 68.
163 Michelle Markham, ‘The Comparative Dimension’ ibid 118.
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to resolve differences.164 Later, pursuant to an OECD initiative, some treaties were
amended in 2008 to require mandatory arbitration if negotiations failed.165 Finally,
the OECD initiated a ‘BEPS’ project addressing ‘BEPS’ resulting in a multilateral in-
strument with refinements to MAPs. Although the ‘Action 14’ of the BEPS initiative
recommended commitment to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective
by providing for mandatory binding MAP arbitration in the bilateral tax treaties as a
mechanism to guarantee that treaty-related disputes will be resolved within a speci-
fied time frame, the multilateral instrument itself allowed, but did not require, states
to opt into the provisions for mandatory binding arbitration.166
Country-to-country arbitration under income tax treaties provides a second fertile
ground for fiscal arbitration. International organizations such as the OECD and the
ICC as well as several national fiscal authorities, including Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Germany, and the USA, have undertaken a number of important efforts to provide
for arbitration of disputes arising out of double taxation issues.167 Such tax treaty ar-
bitration meets the needs of multinational corporate groups seeking symmetrical
treatment of income inclusions and deductions in different countries.
For example, a royalty payment might be made by a French subsidiary to its
American parent. As between the French and American tax authorities, different
views might exist on the correct amount of royalty. The varying applications of na-
tional anti-avoidance measures, intended to prevent abusive ‘transfer pricing’, might
164 See, eg the 1989 Convention between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
and to Certain Other Taxes, art 25, s 5 (quoted in Appendix A). For a different approach, involving re-
course to an ‘advisory commission’ when mutual agreement fails, see the 1990 EC convention on the
elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises
(No L 225/10). Official Journal of the European Communities, 90/436/EEC, art 7.
165 The earliest income tax treaty containing an arbitration provision appears to be the 1926 UK–Irish Free
State convention, which in art 7 provides that questions on interpretation of the treaty ‘shall be deter-
mined by such tribunal as may be agreed between them [the Parties], and the determination of such tri-
bunal shall, as between them, be final’. Other tax treaties with arbitration provisions (both mandatory
and non-mandatory) have been set forth in Appendix A.
166 According to one count, out of approximately 3000 bilateral tax treaties in effect in 2017, only 178 con-
tained an arbitration clause. HM Pit, ‘Arbitration under the OECD Multilateral Instrument:
Reservations, Options and Choices’ (2017) 71 Bull Int Taxn 10, Journals IBFD, 445. As discussed be-
low, art 19 of a Multilateral Instrument, adopted that year by the OECD, introduced binding arbitration
(Part VI of the Instrument) with the proviso, ‘A Party may choose to apply this Part’ with respect to its
covered tax agreements, and adding for the avoidance of doubt that the arbitration obligations shall ap-
ply ‘only where both Contracting Jurisdictions have made’ notifications with the Secretary General of
the OECD, defined as the Instrument’s Depository.
167 William W Park and David R Tillinghast, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration (2004); Marcus Desax and
Marc Veit, ‘Arbitration of Tax Treaty Disputes: The OECD Proposal’ (2007) 23 Arb Int’l 405; OECD;
Improving the Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 30 January
2007); Mario Züger, Arbitration under Tax Treaties (2001); Zvi D Altman, Dispute Resolution under Tax
Treaties (2005); Draft Bilateral Convention Article, Doc No 180/455 Rev (10 September 2001) (Draft
Proposal by ICC Commission on Taxation); Robert Couzin, ‘Arbitration in Tax Treaties’ (2002) 29
TPIR 12; Sed Crest, ‘A New Way to Resolve International Tax Disputes’ International Tax Review 24
(May 2005) (Interview with Tjaco van de Houte, Secretary General of PCA). For a more doubtful view
of tax treaty arbitration, see Michael J McIntyre, ‘Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret and
Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes’ (2006) 9 Florida Tax Rev 622.
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result in income to the American parent without an equal deduction to the French
subsidiary.
Although not double taxation in a juridical sense (given the separate corporate
personalities of parent and subsidiary), such situations do present economic double
taxation. The same income is taxed twice, to the extent that an inclusion in the
American company’s taxable profits has not been offset by a corresponding deduc-
tion in France. The multinational’s position would be that of a stakeholder, willing to
pay tax to either the USA or to France, but not to both countries. Tax treaty arbitra-
tion provides one hope for fiscal symmetry, thereby reducing the fiscal barriers to
cross-border trade and investment.
To meet the challenge of double taxation of cross-border transactions, the
OECD’s model bilateral tax treaty168 attempts to address a number of these issues,
in part by providing an MAP under Article 25 to resolve disputes between tax au-
thorities, investors, and states about double taxation and tax loopholes.169
Article 25, which provides for the MAP under the model treaty, allows investors
to bring double taxation claims to a ‘competent authority’ of either contracting state
within three years.170 Under Article 25, the competent authority ‘should endeavor’
to provide a mutually agreeable solution to the dispute.171 Any solution must be
reached by consensus of the parties. In theory, the MAP should allow investors to
bypass unreliable domestic remedies and have their disputes resolved in a timely,
predictable manner.172
Many countries have incorporated some form of Article 25 into their bilateral tax
treaties. For example, the US–Belgium173 and Japan–Netherlands174 bilateral tax
168 OECD Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital <http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf>.
169 In June 2015, the OECD released a package of measures for the implementation of a new Country-by-
Country Reporting plan developed under the OECD/G20 BEPS Project.
170 A ‘competent authority’ is a term used in tax conventions to identify the position, person, or body to
whom issues can be addressed within the contracting state that is one of the two parties to a tax conven-
tion. The competent authority for each country is typically identified in the Definitions article of the tax
convention (for example, under art 3 (General Definitions) of the OECD Model Tax Convention). A
typical designation would be ‘the Minister of Finance or his authorised representative’ or ‘the Secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate’. The authority is usually delegated within a tax administration to a level
that will administer a country’s MAP programme.
171 art 25(2), OECD MAP, with 2014 adjustments.
172 For example, the UK’s ‘Litigation and Settlement Strategy‘ encourages tax authorities to promote means
of alternative tax dispute resolution, such as mediation and arbitration, whenever possible.
173 See art 24 of the Convention between the Government of the USA and the Government of the UK of
Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, signed on 27 November 2006, entered into force on 28 December 2007 <http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/belgiumtt06.pdf>. Arbitration is not allowed until two years after the compe-
tent authority first received the case. Belgium has complied with these dispute resolution protocols. See
letter dated 14 June 2012 from the US Secretary of the Treasury to Vice-President Biden concerning
Belgium’s compliance <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
TreasCert-2012-Belgium-Tax-Treaty-Article-25-Certification.pdf>.
174 See art 24(5) and Protocol para 12 of Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Japan
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, which requires exhaustion of competent authority remedies before arbitration, provides for a
panel of three arbitrators, and requires parties to implement the arbitral tribunal’s decision within two
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treaties include arbitration clauses175 that provide for binding, mandatory, ad hoc
arbitration governed by a traditional three-arbitrator panel that will use the ‘last best
offer’ (or ‘baseball’) approach, in which each party submits its best offer and arbitra-
tors choose which of the two offers will be used to resolve the dispute. These treaties
characterize binding arbitration as a ‘last resort’ dispute resolution option, to be
used only when the competent authority process has failed to produce voluntary
consensus.176 One scholar has observed that developed economies have chosen to
incorporate the least-binding form of mandatory MAP arbitration in order to use
strategies like last best offer dispute resolution methods and exhaustion clauses to
limit an arbitrator’s discretion to interfere with tax sovereignty.177
Other OECD member and observer countries have refused to incorporate Article
25(5) due to concerns about national sovereignty, domestic policy, and the relatively
broad jurisdictional scope of Article 25.178 Others have included Article 25 but have
required investors to first exhaust domestic tax dispute resolution mechanisms before
turning to the MAP. The non-binding, consensus-based nature of the MAP process
also leads to undue delays. Even OECD countries that give investors unfettered ac-
cess to the MAP have found that their competent authorities have become overbur-
dened, with backlogs of disputes leading to three- to five-year delays. In light of the
delays in the MAP process and in light of the desire to avoid domestic litigation,
some companies have abandoned the MAP for ad hoc administrative appeals and me-
diation. India, for example, offers ad hoc tax dispute resolution under its 2009 law.179
This situation led PricewaterhouseCoopers to declare in 2012 that ‘the future [multi-
national tax] audit and controversy environment may demand grand ideas’ such as
‘an international court of tax justice’, while recognizing the complex jurisdictional,
sovereignty, and procedural problems such a court would present.180
years of receipt of the decision. Signed on 25 August 2010, entered into force in August 2012 <https://
www.government.nl/documents/directives/2010/08/25/tax-treaty-between-japan-and-netherlands>.
175 The US has also included mandatory arbitration clauses in bilateral tax treaties with Canada, Germany,
France, and Switzerland and will likely include such clauses in treaties with around 15 other countries in
the next five years. The International Centre for Dispute Resolution will administer all US tax treaty
arbitrations, see IRS website concerning mandatory tax treaty arbitration <http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/International-Businesses/Mandatory-Tax-Treaty-Arbitration>.
176 See PricewaterhouseCoopers Alert, New US–Japan tax treaty protocol to introduce mandatory arbitra-
tion, 30 January 2013.
177 Ehab Farah, ‘Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem’
(2009) 9 Fla Tax Rev 703, 15–17.
178 See the BEPS December 2014 Action 14 plan, 20 <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf>.
In addition, fn 1 of art 25 of the OECD model as it stood in 2008 recognized that since some members
had concerns about national sovereignty and did not intend to adopt mandatory arbitration, it was ‘un-
necessary for OECD member countries and non-OECD economies to state their observations, reserva-
tions, and positions on the provision and its interpretation’. This has led to a lack of information about
countries’ positions on tax arbitration.
179 See India’s 2009 amendment to its Income Tax Act of 1961, Notification No 84/2009 [FNO 142/22/
2009-TPL]/SO 2958(E) dated 20 November 2009 <http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/pages/rules/in
come-tax-dispute-resolution-panel-rules.aspx>.
180 See PricewaterhouseCoopers alert, Managing Tax Controversy, Challenges on the Horizon, June 2012,
35.
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4.2 The OECD initiative: BEPS
4.2.1 BEPS Action Items 14 and 15
Rightly or wrongly, both governmental and private commentators have expressed
concern about multinational corporations allegedly shifting profits from one country
to another as part of a strategy to reduce fiscal obligations. Of course, a somewhat
contrary phenomenon may also occur, as discussed below, when two nations impose
an economic double taxation on the same profits, albeit on the books of related com-
panies within a single corporate group.
The OECD initiated a project to address the so-called ‘BEPS’.181 Begun in 2013,
this project led to a final report two years later, followed by signature in Paris in
2017 of a multilateral instrument on tax measures aimed at artificially moving profits
to locations where the income was subject to reduced taxation.
In respect of tax arbitration, two key provisions in the final BEPS proposals lie
within the so-called ‘Action Items’ numbered 14 and 15, dealing respectively with
dispute resolution and a multilateral tax treaty.
The traditional network of international tax agreements aimed (at least ostensi-
bly182) at a situation in which two nations might impose a tax on the same profits.
In contrast, the BEPS initiative responded to anxiety about a different phenomenon,
which in lay language might be termed ‘double non-taxation’. Gaps or mismatches in
national law might result in revenue escaping what some observers considered an ap-
propriate level of taxation. Rightly or wrong, without timidity in asserting simple
explanations for complex phenomena, some commentators suggested that base ero-
sion was to blame for ‘escalating rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment’ by
reason of inadequate payments of corporate tax.183 The OECD published an ‘Action
Plan’ with 15 items, each of which was referred to on its own as an ‘Action’.
4.2.2. More effective dispute resolution mechanism
An item styled ‘BEPS Action 14’ addressing More Effective Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms recommended changes to enhance efficiency in the arbitration provi-
sions of Article 25 in the existing OECD Model Tax Convention, added in 2008 to
181 The OECD initiative responded to concerns expressed by the so-called ‘Group of Twenty’ (G-20) major
economies that governments were ill-equipped to address the way global corporations allegedly
exploited gaps in national laws such as to undermine fiscal fairness and integrity. The G-20 includes
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and the EU.
182 In some instances, the practical effect of a double tax treaty was simply to shift fiscal jurisdiction from
one country to another. Credit for foreign taxes provided by national legislation often alleviated much of
the double burden, giving a taxpayer an offset for amounts paid abroad. The treaty typically reduced the
maximum rate at source, yielding less offset by credit, and thus more tax to the place where the taxpayer
resided. For example, a $100 dividend paid by a Ruritanian company to a shareholder in the USA might
be subject to a 10% withholding tax in Ruritania. The American taxpayer subject to 30% tax at home
would pay $20 to the USA, with the $30 otherwise payable to the US Treasury reduced by a credit for
the $10 collected abroad. If the relevant double tax treaty limited Ruritanian tax to 5%, then allocation
of taxing competence would mean $25 paid to the USA and $5 to Ruritania, effectively shifting some fis-
cal competence from where the dividend had its source to the shareholder’s residence.
183 See, eg comments made by Oxfam South Africa to the United Nations <https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/
tax/Beps/CommentsEJNandOxfamSA_BEPS>.
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the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, first published a half-
century earlier.
Paragraph 5 of that article provides as follows:
Where . . . a person has presented a case to the competent authority of a
Contracting State on the basis that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States have resulted for that person in taxation not in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention, and . . . the competent authorities are
unable to reach an agreement to resolve that case . . .. within two years from
the presentation of the case to the competent authority of the other
Contracting State, [then] any unresolved issues arising from the case shall be
submitted to arbitration if the person so requests. These unresolved issues
shall not, however, be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues has
already been rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of either State.
Unless a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agree-
ment that implements the arbitration decision, that decision shall be binding
on both Contracting States and shall be implemented notwithstanding any
time limits in the domestic laws of these States. The competent authorities of
the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of applica-
tion of this paragraph.
Earlier versions of the MAP process had been hortatory (and thus largely ineffec-
tive), with an encouragement that governments ‘shall endeavor’ to resolve cases of
disagreement by mutual agreement, but not imposing an obligation to do so.
Realizing the deficiencies in that approach, the OECD had changed its Model
Convention even before the BEPS initiative, which went further in Action Item 14 to
propose greater efficiencies in binding tax arbitration.
The final BEPS reports published in October 2015 included an Action Item 14
comprised of a ‘minimum standard’ of best practices that would enhance the com-
mitment to mandatory binding arbitration. The ‘minimum standard’ includes three
specific items. Member countries must ensure that:
1. treaty obligations related to the MAP are fully implemented in good faith
and that MAP cases are resolved in a timely manner;
2. the implementation of administrative processes that promote the preven-
tion and timely resolution of treaty-related disputes; and
3. taxpayers can access the MAP when eligible.
These standards aim to provide taxpayers with guaranteed measures, such as ac-
cess to MAPs in transfer pricing, resolution in an average time frame of 24 months,
publication of clear rules and guidelines, and identification of documents required
for a request to initiate MAPs.
Although Action Item 14 contains detailed and lengthy obligations, the core
issues of the MAP process remain unresolved. The ‘duty to negotiate’ does not
include a ‘duty to resolve’. Rather, OECD countries remain free to adopt either an
optional arbitration process (in the sense that countries arbitrate only if they wish)
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or no arbitration process at all. The so-called ‘minimum standards’ impose vague
language such as ‘good faith’ and ‘average timeframe’ for resolving MAP cases.184
Rather, Action Item 14 simply kicks the can down the road, by suggesting that a
mandatory binding arbitration provision will be developed as part of the negotiation
of a multilateral instrument envisaged by a subsequent Action Item of BEPS, to
which we shall now turn.
4.2.3 The OECD multilateral instrument
In the final BEPS Report, Action Item 15 addresses development of a Multilateral
Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties,185 to be styled as ‘Multilateral
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting’. Part V of that Instrument includes the traditional ‘Mutual
Agreement Procedure’ without binding arbitration. Competent tax authorities of each
contracting party simply confirm that they will endeavour to resolve taxation not in
accordance with the treaty.
In contrast, Part VI of the Instrument, with its Articles 18–26, provides a process
for mandatory binding arbitration of controversies for which the competent authori-
ties were unable to reach an agreement. These provisions build on the existing arbi-
tration sections in Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
In commercial transactions, lawyers sometimes speak of ‘pre-dispute’ arbitration
clauses and ‘post-dispute’ arbitration agreements.186 An agreement to arbitrate,
reached after a dispute arises, will, of course, bind the two disputing parties.
However, the ‘post-dispute’ nature of the agreement makes the prospect of arbitra-
tion precarious, given that the side finding a tactical advantage in avoiding binding
dispute resolution can simply say ‘no’ to finalization of the agreement. This distinc-
tion between ‘pre-dispute’ and ‘post-dispute’ agreements to arbitrate has long been
part of national legislation, often with an aim to protect ostensibly weaker or less
informed parties. For example, France has long made a distinction between the pre-
dispute clause compromissoire and the post-dispute compromis, the former being valid
only in contracts between merchants (commerçants) or persons contracting with
respect to a professional activity.187
184 See generally SP Govind and L Turcan, ‘Cross-border Tax Dispute Resolution in the 21st Century: A
Comparative Study of Existing Bilateral and Multilateral Remedies’ (2017) Derivatives & Financial
Instruments IBFD, 3.
185 The Multilateral Instrument itself was promulgated on 24 November 2016, followed by a signing cere-
mony in Paris on 7 June 2017 at the OECD headquarters, with texts in both French and English, con-
taining arts 18–26 related to arbitration. As of 19 December 2019, 93 countries had signed the
instrument, and 38 had deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval. See <http://
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf> accessed on 11 January 2020. The
Instrument came into effect on 1 July 2018. Notably, the USA did not sign the instrument, although
American delegates participated actively in the BEPS process.
186 See generally, William W Park, ‘Explaining Arbitration Law’ in Julio César Betancourt (ed), Defining
Issues in International Arbitration: Celebrating 100 Years of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2016) 7.
187 See C Civ art 2061 (Fr) (recently liberalized by Law No 2001-420 of 15 May 2001, art 126, JO, 16 May
2001, 7776 (Loi sur les nouvelles relations économiques, art 126) to provide that ‘. . . a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clause is valid in contracts concluded with respect to professional activity . . . la clause compromis-
soire est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une activité professionnelle’). Pre-dispute clauses
are now allowed among members of the so-called liberal professions (such as lawyers, doctors, and
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Article 18 of the Instrument permits the contracting parties either to accept or to
reject the arbitration provisions of that Part. Article 19 then continues with
‘Mandatory Binding Arbitration’ if the competent tax authorities ‘are unable to reach
an agreement to resolve’ a case presented within a period of two years. In such
instances, ‘a person’ (which is to say, the taxpayer) may trigger arbitration if that
person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting Jurisdictions
(the taxing countries) ‘result or will result for that person in taxation not in accor-
dance with the provisions’ of the relevant tax treaty. In such instances, any unre-
solved issues ‘shall, if the person so requests in writing, be submitted to arbitration’
in the manner described by the instrument.
Article 20 of the Instrument provides for establishment of an ‘arbitral panel’ (the
equivalent of a ‘tribunal’ in commercial and investor–state cases) with one arbitrator
appointed by each state, and those two arbitrators, within 60 days of the latter ap-
pointment, selecting a third member to chair the proceedings. In default of appoint-
ment, either for a state-selected arbitrator (or for the presiding ‘Chair’), the selection
will be made by ‘the highest ranking official of the Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’,
provided that such person not be a national of either of the Contracting States which
are party to the dispute.
The taxpayer thus makes no direct appointment to the arbitral tribunal, unlike
commercial or investor–state arbitration. Although the taxpayer may trigger the arbi-
tration, the process remains in large measure state-to-state dispute resolution, bind-
ing on the competent authorities of the two countries.
Other aspects of the arbitral procedure remain worthy of note, contrasting with
most other forms of binding international dispute resolution. For better or for
worse, the arbitration provision of that multilateral instrument fixes a form of
‘baseball arbitration’ with an unreasoned decision, with Article 23(c) providing as
follows:
The arbitration panel shall select as its decision one of the proposed resolu-
tions for the case submitted by the competent authorities with respect to each
issue and any threshold questions, and shall not include a rationale or any
other explanation of the decision. The arbitration decision will be adopted by a
simple majority of the panel members. The arbitration panel shall deliver its
decision in writing to the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions. The arbitration decision shall have no precedential value.
The arbitrators must thus select one of the proposed resolutions suggested by
the tax authorities. Such a ‘last offer’ or ‘baseball arbitration’ process excludes any
resolution of the dispute which has not been endorsed by at least one of the two
governments.188
architects), tradesmen (such as artisans), and farmers (such as agricultures), as well as in professional
partnership agreements. See generally Philippe Fouchard, ‘La Laborieuse réforme de la clause compro-
missoire par la loi du 15 mai 2001’ (2001) 3 Rev Arb 397; C Com art 631 (Fr) (covering merchants).
188 The notion of ‘baseball’ arbitration derives from the process for setting compensation of major league
American ballplayers in the USA. The late winter often finds baseball players asking for more than the
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Finally, the decision will be ‘non reasoned’ in the sense that it contains no expla-
nation. For those involved in either commercial or investor–state cases, this may
appear the most bizarre of provisions, given the traditional assumption that the dis-
puting parties will be entitled to some assurance that the arbitrators have engaged in
relatively rigorous analysis, rather than just flipping a coin.
5 . C O N C L U S I O N
In a world without supranational courts of mandatory jurisdiction, arbitration
supplies a relatively neutral and independent adjudicatory process for the vindication
of economic rights. Otherwise, each side may end up seeking the hometown justice
of its own courts.
Such hometown justice, even if satisfactory to the hometown boy or girl, will not
likely promote the transactional reliability on which efficient economic cooperation
rests. Lack of reliable dispute resolution means either less cross-border cooperation
or greater prices to justify increased risks. Even if some deals might promise profits
high enough to lure adventurous entrepreneurs to take litigation risks without neu-
tral dispute resolution, other wealth-creating transactions will not.
When cross-border business relationships implicate fiscal disputes, arbitration
remains a vital option in seeking to enhance the reliability of international transac-
tions. Arbitration of tax disputes commends itself not only for cross-border commer-
cial transactions but also for service related to investment treaties, which attempt
to balance competing interests of investors and host states, and state-to-state contro-
versies about a mutual agreement among tax administrations.
team wish to pay. Each side must submit its ‘last best offer’ from which arbitrators must choose one po-
sition or the other. Faced with the prospect of an arbitrator who will see things with a relative amount
of realism, the player becomes more modest in his demands, and the team more generous in its com-
pensation. As the player moves from a request for $10 to a request for $6, and the team goes from its of-
fer of $3 to a proposal of $5.5, the two sides find a common ground that permits last-minute
settlement.
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APPENDIX A: Illustrative Tax Treaty Arbitration Provisions
Optional Arbitration Provisions
Convention Between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes (Article
25, Section 5)
Bonn, August 1989
Disagreements between the Contracting States regarding the interpretation or ap-
plication of this Convention shall, as far as possible, be settled by the competent
authorities. If a disagreement cannot be resolved by the competent authorities it
may, if both competent authorities agree, be submitted for arbitration. The proce-
dures shall be agreed upon and shall be established between the Contracting
States by notes to be exchanged through diplomatic channels.
Amended to provide for mandatory arbitration, as noted in new text (June 2006)
set forth infra.
US Tax Convention with the Netherlands (Article 29, Section 5)
Washington, October 1993
If any difficulty or doubt arising as to the interpretation or application of this
Convention cannot be resolved by the competent authorities in an MAP pursuant
to the previous paragraphs of this Article, the case may, if both competent authori-
ties and the taxpayer(s) agree, be submitted for arbitration, provided the taxpayer
agrees in writing to be bound by the decision of the arbitration board. The deci-
sion of the arbitration board in a particular case shall be binding on both states
with respect to that case.
OECD Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures
to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Part VI Arbitration, Article 18).
NB: Referred to as Multilateral ‘Instrument’ in BEPS Action Item 15
Paris, November 2016
A Party may choose to apply this Part with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements
and shall notify the Depositary accordingly. This Part shall apply in relation to two
Contracting Jurisdictions with respect to a Covered Tax Agreement only where both
Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notification.
Mandatory Arbitration Provision
Convention Between the USA and the Kingdom of Belgium for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income (Article 24, Section 7)
Bruxelles, November 2006
Where, pursuant to an MAP under this Article, the competent authorities have
endeavoured but are unable to reach a complete agreement in a case, the case
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shall be resolved through arbitration conducted in the manner prescribed by, and
subject to, the requirements of paragraph 8 and any rules or procedures agreed
upon by the Contracting States if:
a. tax returns have been filed with at least one of the Contracting States with
respect to the taxable years at issue in the case;
b. the case is not a particular case that the competent authorities agree, before
the date on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun, is
not suitable for determination by arbitration; and
c. all concerned persons agree according to the provisions of subparagraph
(d) of paragraph 8.
Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Japan for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income (Article 24, Section 5)
Tokyo, August 2010
Where,
a. under paragraph 1, a person has presented a case to the competent author-
ity of a Contracting State on the basis that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States have resulted for that person in taxation not in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Convention and
b. the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement to resolve that
case pursuant to paragraph 2 within two years from the presentation of the
case to the competent authority of the other Contracting State, any unre-
solved issues arising from the case shall be submitted to arbitration if the
person so requests. These unresolved issues shall not, however, be submit-
ted to arbitration if a decision on these issues has already been rendered by
a court or administrative tribunal of either Contracting State. The compe-
tent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle
the mode of application of this paragraph.
Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Government of the USA
and the Government of the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of the Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital (Article X)
Paris, August 1994, as amended by the protocol signed on December 2004
Paragraph 5 of Article 26 (MAP) shall be deleted and replaced by the following
paragraphs:
Where, pursuant to an MAP under this Article, the competent authorities have
endeavoured but are unable to reach a complete agreement, the case shall be re-
solved through arbitration conducted in the manner prescribed by, and subject to,
the requirements of paragraph 6 and any rules or procedures agreed upon by the
Contracting States, if:
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a. tax returns have been filed with at least one of the Contracting States with
respect to the taxable years at issue in the case;
b. the case is not a particular case that both competent authorities agree, be-
fore the date on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun,
is not suitable for determination by arbitration; and
c. all concerned persons agree according to the provisions of subparagraph
(d) of paragraph 6.
An unresolved case shall not, however, be submitted to arbitration if a decision on
such case has already been rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of either
Contracting State.
Convention Between the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes (Article XIII)
Berlin, June 2006
Paragraph 5 of Article 25 (MAP) of the Convention shall be deleted and replaced
with the following paragraph:
where, pursuant to an MAP under this Article, the competent authorities have
endeavoured but are unable to reach a complete agreement in a case, the case
shall be resolved through arbitration conducted in the manner prescribed by, and
subject to, the requirements of paragraph 6 and any rules or procedures agreed
upon by the Contracting States, if:
(a) tax returns have been filed with at least one of the Contracting States with re-
spect to the taxable years at issue in the case;
(b) the case
(aa) is a case that
(A) involves the application of one or more articles that the Contracting States
have agreed shall be the subject of arbitration and
(B) is not a particular case that the competent authorities agree, before the date
on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun, is not suitable for
determination by arbitration, or
(bb) is a particular case that the competent authorities agree is suitable for deter-
mination by arbitration; and
(c) all concerned persons agree according to the provisions of subparagraph (d)
of paragraph 6.
6. For the purposes of paragraph 5 and this paragraph, the following rules and
definitions shall apply:
(a) The term ‘concerned person’ means the presenter of a case to a competent
authority for consideration under this Article and all other persons, if any, whose
tax liability to either Contracting State may be directly affected by a mutual agree-
ment arising from that consideration;
(b) the ‘commencement date’ for a case is the earliest date on which the informa-
tion necessary to undertake substantive consideration for a mutual agreement has
been received by both competent authorities;
(c) Arbitration proceedings in a case shall begin on the later of:
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(aa) two years after the commencement date of that case, unless both competent
authorities have previously agreed to a different date, and
(bb) the earliest date upon which the agreement required by subparagraph (d)
has been received by both competent authorities;
(d) the concerned person(s), and their authorized representatives or agents,
must agree prior to the beginning of arbitration proceedings not to disclose to
any other person any information received during the course of the arbitration
proceeding from either Contracting State or the arbitration board, other than
the determination of such board;
(e) unless any concerned person does not accept the determination of an arbitra-
tion board, the determination shall constitute a resolution by mutual agreement
under this Article and shall be binding on both Contracting States with respect to
that case; and
(f) for purposes of an arbitration proceeding under paragraph 5 and this para-
graph, the members of the arbitration board and their staffs shall be considered
‘persons or authorities’ to whom information may be disclosed under Article 26
(Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) of the Convention.
APPENDIX B: ECT189
A R T I C L E 2 1
1. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in this Treaty shall cre-
ate rights or impose obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the
Contracting Parties. In the event of any inconsistency between this Article
and any other provision of the Treaty, this Article shall prevail to the extent
of the inconsistency.
2. Article 7(3) [‘no less favorable treatment’ provisions] shall apply to
Taxation Measures other than those on income or on capital, except that
such provision shall not apply to:
a. an advantage accorded by a Contracting Party pursuant to the tax provi-
sions of any convention, agreement, or arrangement described in sub-
paragraph (7)(a)(ii); or
b. any Taxation Measure aimed at ensuring the effective collection of taxes,
except where the measure of a Contracting Party arbitrarily discriminates
against Energy Materials and Products originating in, or destined for the
Area of another Contracting Party or arbitrarily restricts benefits
accorded under Article 7(3).
3. Article 10(2) and (7) [‘no less favorable’ treatment provisions] shall apply
to Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties other than those on in-
come or on capital, except that such provisions shall not apply to:
189 ECT (n 3). Entry into Force 1998.
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a. impose most favoured nation obligations with respect to advantages
accorded by a Contracting Party pursuant to the tax provisions of any
convention, agreement, or arrangement described in subparagraph
(7)(a)(ii) or resulting from membership of any Regional Economic
Integration Organization; or
b. any Taxation Measure aimed at ensuring the effective collection of taxes,
except where the measure arbitrarily discriminates against an Investor of
another Contracting Party or arbitrarily restricts benefits accorded under
the Investment provisions of this Treaty.
4. Article 29(2) to (8) [interim trade matters] shall apply to Taxation
Measures other than those on income or on capital.
61 Modification based on Article 2 of the Amendment
5.
a. Article 13 [expropriation] shall apply to taxes.
b. Whenever an issue arises under Article 13, to the extent it pertains to
whether a tax constitutes an expropriation or whether a tax alleged to
constitute an expropriation is discriminatory, the following provisions
shall apply:
i. the Investor or the Contracting Party alleging expropriation shall re-
fer the issue of whether the tax is an expropriation or whether the tax
is discriminatory to the relevant Competent Tax Authority. Failing
such referral by the Investor or the Contracting Party, bodies called
upon to settle disputes pursuant to Article 26(2)(c) or 27(2) shall
make a referral to the relevant Competent Tax Authorities;
ii. the Competent Tax Authorities shall, within a period of six months
of such referral, strive to resolve the issues so referred. Where non-
discrimination issues are concerned, the Competent Tax Authorities
shall apply the non-discrimination provisions of the relevant tax con-
vention or, if there is no non-discrimination provision in the relevant
tax convention applicable to the tax or no such tax convention is in
force between the Contracting Parties concerned, they shall apply
the non-discrimination principles under the Model Tax Convention
on Income and Capital of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development;
iii. bodies called upon to settle disputes pursuant to Article 26(2)(c) or
27(2) may take into account any conclusions arrived at by the
Competent Tax Authorities regarding whether the tax is an expropri-
ation. Such bodies shall take into account any conclusions arrived at
within the six-month period prescribed in subparagraph (b)(ii) by
the Competent Tax Authorities regarding whether the tax is discrimi-
natory. Such bodies may also take into account any conclusions ar-
rived at by the Competent Tax Authorities after the expiry of the six-
month period;
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iv. under no circumstances shall involvement of the Competent Tax
Authorities, beyond the end of the six-month period referred to in
subparagraph (b)(ii), lead to a delay of proceedings under Articles
26 and 27.
6. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 14 shall not limit the right of a
Contracting Party to impose or collect a tax by withholding or other means.
7. For the purposes of this Article:
a. The term ‘Taxation Measure’ includes:
i. any provision relating to taxes of the domestic law of the Contracting
Party or of a political subdivision thereof or a local authority therein;
and
ii. any provision relating to taxes of any convention for the avoidance of
double taxation or of any other international agreement or arrange-
ment by which the Contracting Party is bound.
b. There shall be regarded as taxes on income or on capital all taxes im-
posed on total income, on total capital, or on elements of income or of
capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of property, taxes on
estates, inheritances and gifts, or substantially similar taxes, taxes on the
total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes on
capital appreciation.
c. A ‘Competent Tax Authority’ means the competent authority pursuant
to a double taxation agreement in force between the Contracting Parties
or, when no such agreement is in force, the minister or ministry respon-
sible for taxes or their authorized representatives.
d. For the avoidance of doubt, the terms ‘tax provisions’ and ‘taxes’ do not
include customs duties.
APPENDIX C: OECD MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT190
P A R T V I . A R B I T R A T I O N
Article 18: Choice to apply Part VI
A party may choose to apply this Part with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements and shall notify
the Depositary accordingly. This Part shall apply in relation to two Contracting Jurisdictions with
respect to a Covered Tax Agreement only where both Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a
notification.
190 Multilateral Instrument promulgated on 24 November 2016, followed by a signing ceremony in Paris
on 7 June 2017 at the OECD headquarters, with texts in both French and English, containing arts 18–
26 related to arbitration. The Instrument came into effect on 1 July 2018. As of December 2019, 93
countries had signed the instrument, and 38 had deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, or
approval. See <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf> accessed on 11
January 2020. Notably, the USA did not sign the instrument, although American delegates participated
actively in the BEPS process.






/arbitration/article-abstract/36/2/157/5843840 by guest on 02 July 2020
Article 19: Mandatory binding arbitration
1. Where:
a. under a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement (as it may be modified
by paragraph 1 of Article 16 (MAP)) that provides that a person may
present a case to a competent authority of a Contracting Jurisdiction
where that person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting Jurisdictions result or will result for that person in taxation
not in accordance with the provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement
(as it may be modified by the Convention), a person has presented a
case to the competent authority of a Contracting Jurisdiction on the ba-
sis that the actions of one or both of the Contracting Jurisdictions have
resulted for that person in taxation not in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Covered Tax Agreement (as it may be modified by the
Convention); and
b. the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement to resolve
that case pursuant to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement (as it
may be modified by paragraph 2 of Article 16 (MAP)) that provides
that the competent authority shall endeavour to resolve the case by mu-
tual agreement with the competent authority of the other Contracting
Jurisdiction, within a period of two years beginning on the start date re-
ferred to in paragraph 8 or 9, as the case may be (unless, prior to the
expiration of that period the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions have agreed to a different time period with respect to that
case and have notified the person who presented the case of such agree-
ment), any unresolved issues arising from the case shall, if the person
so requests in writing, be submitted to arbitration in the manner de-
scribed in this Part, according to any rules or procedures agreed upon
by the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions pursuant
to the provisions of paragraph 10.
2. Where a competent authority has suspended the MAP referred to in para-
graph 1 because a case with respect to one or more of the same issues is
pending before court or administrative tribunal, the period provided in
subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 will stop running until either a final deci-
sion has been rendered by the court or administrative tribunal or the case
has been suspended or withdrawn. In addition, where a person who pre-
sented a case and a competent authority have agreed to suspend the MAP,
the period provided in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 will stop running
until the suspension has been lifted.
3. Where both competent authorities agree that a person directly affected by
the case has failed to provide in a timely manner any additional material
information requested by either competent authority after the start of the
period provided in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1, the period provided
in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 shall be extended for an amount of
time equal to the period beginning on the date by which the information
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was requested and ending on the date on which that information was
provided.
4.
a. The arbitration decision with respect to the issues submitted to arbitra-
tion shall be implemented through the mutual agreement concerning
the case referred to in paragraph 1. The arbitration decision shall be
final.
b. The arbitration decision shall be binding on both Contracting
Jurisdictions except in the following cases:
i. if a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual
agreement that implements the arbitration decision. In such a case,
the case shall not be eligible for any further consideration by the
competent authorities. The mutual agreement that implements the
arbitration decision on the case shall be considered not to be ac-
cepted by a person directly affected by the case if any person di-
rectly affected by the case does not, within 60 days after the date on
which notification of the mutual agreement is sent to the person,
withdraw all issues resolved in the mutual agreement implementing
the arbitration decision from consideration by any court or adminis-
trative tribunal or otherwise terminate any pending court or admin-
istrative proceedings with respect to such issues in a manner
consistent with that mutual agreement.
ii. if a final decision of the courts of one of the Contracting
Jurisdictions holds that the arbitration decision is invalid. In such a
case, the request for arbitration under paragraph 1 shall be consid-
ered not to have been made, and the arbitration process shall be
considered not to have taken place (except for the purposes of
Articles 21 (Confidentiality of Arbitration Proceedings) and 25
(Costs of Arbitration Proceedings)). In such a case, a new request
for arbitration may be made unless the competent authorities agree
that such a new request should not be permitted.
iii. if a person directly affected by the case pursues litigation on the
issues which were resolved in the mutual agreement implementing
the arbitration decision in any court or administrative tribunal.
5. The competent authority that received the initial request for an MAP as
described in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 shall, within two calendar
months of receiving the request:
a. send a notification to the person who presented the case that it has re-
ceived the request and
b. send a notification of that request, along with a copy of the request, to
the competent authority of the other Contracting Jurisdiction.
6. Within three calendar months after a competent authority receives the re-
quest for an MAP (or a copy thereof from the competent authority of the
other Contracting Jurisdiction) it shall either:
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a. notify the person who has presented the case and the other competent
authority that it has received the information necessary to undertake
substantive consideration of the case; or
b. request additional information from that person for that purpose.
7. Where pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph 6, one or both of the
competent authorities have requested from the person who presented the
case additional information necessary to undertake substantive consider-
ation of the case, the competent authority that requested the additional in-
formation shall, within three calendar months of receiving the additional
information from that person, notify that person and the other competent
authority either:
a. that it has received the requested information; or
b. that some of the requested information is still missing.
8. Where neither competent authority has requested additional information
pursuant to subparagraph (b) of paragraph 6, the start date referred to in
paragraph 1 shall be the earlier of:
a. the date on which both competent authorities have notified the person
who presented the case pursuant to subparagraph (a) of paragraph 6
and
b. the date that is three calendar months after the notification to the com-
petent authority of the other Contracting Jurisdiction pursuant to sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 5.
9. Where additional information has been requested pursuant to subpara-
graph (b) of paragraph 6, the start date referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
the earlier of:
a. the latest date on which the competent authorities that requested addi-
tional information have notified the person who presented the case and
the other competent authority pursuant to subparagraph (a) of para-
graph 7 and
b. the date that is three calendar months after both competent authorities
have received all information requested by either competent authority
from the person who presented the case.
If, however, one or both of the competent authorities send the notifica-
tion referred to in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 7, such notification
shall be treated as a request for additional information under subpara-
graph (b) of paragraph 6.
10. The competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions shall by mutual
agreement (pursuant to the article of the relevant Covered Tax Agreement
regarding procedures for mutual agreement) settle the mode of application
of the provisions contained in this Part, including the minimum informa-
tion necessary for each competent authority to undertake substantive con-
sideration of the case. Such an agreement shall be concluded before the
date on which unresolved issues in a case are first eligible to be submitted
to arbitration and may be modified from time to time thereafter.
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11. For purposes of applying this Article to its Covered Tax Agreements, a
Party may reserve the right to replace the two-year period set forth in sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 with a three-year period.
12. A Party may reserve the right for the following rules to apply with respect
to its Covered Tax Agreements notwithstanding the other provisions of
this Article:
a. any unresolved issue arising from an MAP case otherwise within the
scope of the arbitration process provided for by this Convention shall
not be submitted to arbitration, if a decision on this issue has already
been rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of either
Contracting Jurisdiction;
b. if, at any time after a request for arbitration has been made and before
the arbitration panel has delivered its decision to the competent author-
ities of the Contracting Jurisdictions, a decision concerning the issue is
rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of one of the
Contracting Jurisdictions, the arbitration process shall terminate.
Article 20: Appointment of arbitrators
1. Except to the extent that the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions mutually agree on different rules, paragraphs 2–4 shall apply
for the purposes of this Part.
2. The following rules shall govern the appointment of the members of an ar-
bitration panel:
a. The arbitration panel shall consist of three individual members with ex-
pertise or experience in international tax matters.
b. Each competent authority shall appoint one panel member within 60 days
of the date of the request for arbitration under paragraph 1 of Article 19
(Mandatory Binding Arbitration). The two panel members so appointed
shall, within 60 days of the latter of their appointments, appoint a third
member who shall serve as Chair of the arbitration panel. The Chair shall
not be a national or resident of either Contracting Jurisdiction.
c. Each member appointed to the arbitration panel must be impartial and
independent of the competent authorities, tax administrations, and min-
istries of finance of the Contracting Jurisdictions and of all persons di-
rectly affected by the case (as well as their advisors) at the time of
accepting an appointment, maintain his or her impartiality and indepen-
dence throughout the proceedings, and avoid any conduct for a reason-
able period of time thereafter which may damage the appearance of
impartiality and independence of the arbitrators with respect to the
proceedings.
3. In the event that the competent authority of a Contracting Jurisdiction fails
to appoint a member of the arbitration panel in the manner and within the
time periods specified in paragraph 2 or agreed to by the competent author-
ities of the Contracting Jurisdictions, a member shall be appointed on
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behalf of that competent authority by the highest ranking official of the
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development that is not a national of either
Contracting Jurisdiction.
4. If the two initial members of the arbitration panel fail to appoint the Chair in
the manner and within the time periods specified in paragraph 2 or agreed to
by the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions, the Chair shall
be appointed by the highest ranking official of the Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development that is not a national of either Contracting Jurisdiction.
Article 21: Confidentiality of arbitration proceedings
1. Solely for the purposes of the application of the provisions of this Part and
of the provisions of the relevant Covered Tax Agreement and of the
domestic laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions related to the exchange of
information, confidentiality, and administrative assistance, members of the
arbitration panel and a maximum of three staff per member (and prospec-
tive arbitrators solely to the extent necessary to verify their ability to fulfil
the requirements of arbitrators) shall be considered to be persons or au-
thorities to whom information may be disclosed. Information received by
the arbitration panel or prospective arbitrators and information that the
competent authorities receive from the arbitration panel shall be considered
information that is exchanged under the provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement related to the exchange of information and administrative
assistance.
2. The competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions shall ensure that
members of the arbitration panel and their staff agree in writing, prior to
their acting in an arbitration proceeding, to treat any information relating to
the arbitration proceeding consistently with the confidentiality and non-
disclosure obligations described in the provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement related to exchange of information and administrative assistance
and under the applicable laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions.
Article 22: Resolution of a case prior to the conclusion of the arbitration
For the purposes of this Part and the provisions of the relevant Covered Tax Agreement that pro-
vide for resolution of cases through mutual agreement, the MAP, as well as the arbitration proceed-
ing, with respect to a case shall terminate if, at any time after a request for arbitration has been
made and before the arbitration panel has delivered its decision to the competent authorities of the
Contracting Jurisdictions:
a. the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions reach a mutual
agreement to resolve the case or
b. the person who presented the case withdraws the request for arbitration or
the request for an MAP.






/arbitration/article-abstract/36/2/157/5843840 by guest on 02 July 2020
Article 23: Type of arbitration process
1. Except to the extent that the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions mutually agree on different rules, the following rules shall ap-
ply with respect to an arbitration proceeding pursuant to this Part:
a. After a case is submitted to arbitration, the competent authority of each
Contracting Jurisdiction shall submit to the arbitration panel, by a date
set by agreement, a proposed resolution which addresses all unresolved
issue(s) in the case (taking into account all agreements previously
reached in that case between the competent authorities of the
Contracting Jurisdictions). The proposed resolution shall be limited to a
disposition of specific monetary amounts (eg of income or expense) or,
where specified, the maximum rate of tax charged pursuant to the
Covered Tax Agreement, for each adjustment or similar issue in the
case. In a case in which the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions have been unable to reach agreement on an issue regarding
the conditions for application of a provision of the relevant Covered Tax
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as a ‘threshold question’), such as
whether an individual is a resident or whether a permanent establish-
ment exists, the competent authorities may submit alternative proposed
resolutions with respect to issues the determination of which is contin-
gent on resolution of such threshold questions.
b. The competent authority of each Contracting Jurisdiction may also sub-
mit a supporting position paper for consideration by the arbitration
panel. Each competent authority that submits a proposed resolution or
supporting position paper shall provide a copy to the other competent
authority by the date on which the proposed resolution and supporting
position paper were due. Each competent authority may also submit to
the arbitration panel, by a date set by agreement, a reply submission
with respect to the proposed resolution and supporting position paper
submitted by the other competent authority. A copy of any reply submis-
sion shall be provided to the other competent authority by the date on
which the reply submission was due.
c. The arbitration panel shall select as its decision one of the proposed
resolutions for the case submitted by the competent authorities with re-
spect to each issue and any threshold questions, and shall not include a
rationale or any other explanation of the decision. The arbitration deci-
sion will be adopted by a simple majority of the panel members. The
arbitration panel shall deliver its decision in writing to the competent au-
thorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions. The arbitration decision shall
have no precedential value.
2. For the purpose of applying this Article with respect to its Covered Tax
Agreements, a Party may reserve the right for paragraph 1 not to apply to
its Covered Tax Agreements. In such a case, except to the extent that the
competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions mutually agree on
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different rules, the following rules shall apply with respect to an arbitration
proceeding:
a. After a case is submitted to arbitration, the competent authority of each
Contracting Jurisdiction shall provide any information that may be nec-
essary for the arbitration decision to all panel members without undue
delay. Unless the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions
agree otherwise, any information that was not available to both compe-
tent authorities before the request for arbitration was received by both of
them shall not be taken into account for purposes of the decision.
b. The arbitration panel shall decide the issues submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement and, subject to these provisions, of those of the domestic
laws of the Contracting Jurisdictions. The panel members shall also con-
sider any other sources which the competent authorities of the
Contracting Jurisdictions may by mutual agreement expressly identify.
c. The arbitration decision shall be delivered to the competent authorities
of the Contracting Jurisdictions in writing and shall indicate the sources
of law relied upon and the reasoning which led to its result. The arbitra-
tion decision shall be adopted by a simple majority of the panel mem-
bers. The arbitration decision shall have no precedential value.
3. A Party that has not made the reservation described in paragraph 2 may re-
serve the right for the preceding paragraphs of this Article not to apply with
respect to its Covered Tax Agreements with Parties that have made such a
reservation. In such a case, the competent authorities of the Contracting
Jurisdictions of each such Covered Tax Agreement shall endeavour to reach
agreement on the type of arbitration process that shall apply with respect to
that Covered Tax Agreement. Until such an agreement is reached, Article
19 (Mandatory Binding Arbitration) shall not apply with respect to such a
Covered Tax Agreement.
4. A Party may also choose to apply paragraph 5 with respect to its Covered
Tax Agreements and shall notify the Depositary accordingly. Paragraph 5
shall apply in relation to two Contracting Jurisdictions with respect to a
Covered Tax Agreement where either of the Contracting Jurisdictions has
made such a notification.
5. Prior to the beginning of arbitration proceedings, the competent authorities
of the Contracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement shall ensure
that each person that presented the case and their advisors agree in writing
not to disclose to any other person any information received during the
course of the arbitration proceedings from either competent authority or
the arbitration panel. The MAP under the Covered Tax Agreement, as well
as the arbitration proceeding under this Part, with respect to the case shall
terminate if, at any time after a request for arbitration has been made and
before the arbitration panel has delivered its decision to the competent au-
thorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions, a person that presented the case
or one of that person’s advisors materially breaches that agreement.
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6. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, a Party that does not choose to apply para-
graph 5 may reserve the right for paragraph 5 not to apply with respect to
one or more identified Covered Tax Agreements or with respect to all of its
Covered Tax Agreements.
7. A Party that chooses to apply paragraph 5 may reserve the right for this
Part not to apply with respect to all Covered Tax Agreements for which the
other Contracting Jurisdiction makes a reservation pursuant to paragraph 6.
Article 24: Agreement on a different resolution
1. For purposes of applying this Part with respect to its Covered Tax
Agreements, a Party may choose to apply paragraph 2 and shall notify the
Depositary accordingly. Paragraph 2 shall apply in relation to two
Contracting Jurisdictions with respect to a Covered Tax Agreement only
where both Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notification.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 4 of Article 19 (Mandatory Binding Arbitration),
an arbitration decision pursuant to this Part shall not be binding on the
Contracting Jurisdictions to a Covered Tax Agreement and shall not be
implemented if the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions
agree on a different resolution of all unresolved issues within three calendar
months after the arbitration decision has been delivered to them.
3. A Party that chooses to apply paragraph 2 may reserve the right for para-
graph 2 to apply only with respect to its Covered Tax Agreements for which
paragraph 2 of Article 23 (Type of Arbitration Process) applies.
Article 25: Costs of arbitration proceedings
In an arbitration proceeding under this Part, the fees and expenses of the members of the arbitra-
tion panel, as well as any costs incurred in connection with the arbitration proceedings by the
Contracting Jurisdictions, shall be borne by the Contracting Jurisdictions in a manner to be settled
by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the Contracting Jurisdictions. In the
absence of such agreement, each Contracting Jurisdiction shall bear its own expenses and those of
its appointed panel member. The cost of the chair of the arbitration panel and other expenses asso-
ciated with the conduct of the arbitration proceedings shall be borne by the Contracting
Jurisdictions in equal shares.
Article 26: Compatibility
1. Subject to Article 18 (Choice to Apply Part VI), the provisions of this Part
shall apply in place of or in the absence of provisions of a Covered Tax
Agreement that provide for arbitration of unresolved issues arising from an
MAP case. Each Party that chooses to apply this Part shall notify the
Depositary of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements, other than those
that are within the scope of a reservation under paragraph 4, contains such a
provision, and if so, the article and paragraph number of each such provision.
Where two Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to
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a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement, that provision shall be replaced by
the provisions of this Part as between those Contracting Jurisdictions.
2. Any unresolved issue arising from an MAP case otherwise within the scope
of the arbitration process provided for in this Part shall not be submitted to
arbitration if the issue falls within the scope of a case with respect to which
an arbitration panel or similar body has previously been set up in accor-
dance with a bilateral or multilateral convention that provides for manda-
tory binding arbitration of unresolved issues arising from an MAP case.
3. Subject to paragraph 1, nothing in this Part shall affect the fulfilment of
wider obligations with respect to the arbitration of unresolved issues arising
in the context of an MAP resulting from other conventions to which the
Contracting Jurisdictions are or will become parties.
4. A Party may reserve the right for this Part not to apply with respect to one
or more identified Covered Tax Agreements (or to all of its Covered Tax
Agreements) that already provide for mandatory binding arbitration of
unresolved issues arising from an MAP case.
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